


JPRS-EER-90-066  
11 MAY 1990



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# ***JPRS Report***

## **East Europe**

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# East Europe

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## CONTENTS

11 MAY 1990

### POLITICAL

#### YUGOSLAVIA

Leader of Croatian Democratic Community Interviewed [VJESNIK 25 Feb] .....	1
Belgrade Press Coverage of Croatian Policy Analyzed [DANAS 27 Feb] .....	5
Conflicts Between Croatian Human Rights Groups [DANAS 27 Feb] .....	8
Slovene LC CC Secretary on Kosovo, Elections [DANAS 27 Feb] .....	11
Life, Ideas of Kosovo Political Prisoner Demaqi [DANAS 27 Feb] .....	15
Prlja on Foreigners' Ignorance of Serbia [NIN 25 Feb] .....	17
'Anti-Yugoslav' Activities of Albanian Emigre Groups Described [NARODNA ARMIJA 1 Feb] ...	20
Ethnic Albanians Accused of Drug, Arms Smuggling [NIN 4 Feb] .....	26

### ECONOMIC

#### GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

Collective Agriculture Blamed for Increased Ecological Damage [WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFT Mar] .....	29
Auto Industry Survival Plans Sketched [Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG 20 Mar] .....	39

## YUGOSLAVIA

### Leader of Croatian Democratic Community Interviewed

90EB0311A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian  
25 Feb 90 pp 9-10

[Interview with Dr. Franjo Tudjman, president of the Croatian Democratic Community, by Jadranko Sinkovic; place and date not given: "We Have the Most Croatian Program"]

[Text] The Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ] will soon become the largest political organization in Croatia, if it is not already. According to claims by its leaders, the HDZ today has about 200,000 members, almost as many as the Croatian LC, or perhaps even more than the party in power, in view of the trend toward dissolution of the LC's membership. During the preelection period, on the eve of the first free and democratic elections, those facts, even if they were not crucial for electoral success, certainly indicate the fact that after the elections, Croatian political legitimacy, and Yugoslavia's in the foreseeable future, will probably change in a very fundamental manner. What role in this is or will be played by the leaders of today's opposition parties? Is a time of new leaders coming in Croatia?

Dr. Franjo Tudjman, the president of the HDZ, is one of the most serious pretenders to any of the formal leadership positions in Croatian political life. While we were conducting the interview for NEDELJNI VJESNIK, it was not yet known which post the party would nominate its president for (that was to be announced at the HDZ General Assembly), but regardless of that unknown factor, there is also far-reaching significance in the fact that for a long time now, there has almost not been a day when one of the public media has not mentioned the name of Dr. Franjo Tudjman in some context. In spite of the HDZ's campaign slogan—"Our Name Is Our Program"—this party is associated primarily with Tudjman's name, in a fundamentally different way from how the recognized leaders of other parties are associated with the concept and image of their organizations. More than most of the other parties, the HDZ has its own untouchable leader. Precisely for this reason, our first question in interviewing Dr. Franjo Tudjman was what, in his opinion, was the function of a party's leader in the future multiparty system in Croatia?

[Tudjman] That is actually a question about the role of personality in public political life, a question of both theoretical and practical importance, which would require much longer explanations than would be possible in the scope of a newspaper interview. In any case, however, even in developed democracies, where the issue of leaders and chiefs is not as important as in undeveloped democracies and in the case of peoples who are still fighting for their sovereignty, there cannot be any party programs without personalities. A program is the product of specific circumstances, but its stamp is

given by specific personalities. That is consequently also reflected in Croatian political life during this period of democratic transformation, in which we have a variety of personalities and programs on the scene, along with people who have also had a certain role in political life in the past. I think that all of these people should be judged by what they have contributed so far: by what they have written, if they are cultural workers, and by what results they have achieved, if they are political workers.

[VJESNIK] The issue of leaders is often associated with the concept of authoritarianism, and in this respect in particular there has been frequent criticism of the HDZ and of your role in the party.

[Tudjman] That is part of the arsenal of programmed and planned criticism. When people cannot attack the HDZ's program, then they try to attack a personality, and they try to make an issue of my being a former general. In doing so, they forget that I was probably the only general, or at least one of the very few, and not just in Yugoslavia, who took off his general's epaulets to devote himself to scholarship. I returned to the political scene when it became necessary to present publicly approximately the kind of program that the HDZ has. That is not just because of the situation within Yugoslavia, because of what happened in Serbia and Slovenia, but also because of the European and world context. That is because a confusion of ideas appeared in Yugoslavia, if I may borrow an expression from Stjepan Radic, which, just as after 1918, that was anything but an expression of the normal, genuine, and historical aspirations of the Croatian people. It is interesting that the critics, and not just ones from the ranks of the hegemonists and unitarists, but also from among Croatian alternative circles—which proves what their source is and what their goals are—want to make it look as though the HDZ achieved its organizational success, in terms of the number of members, etc., by virtue of the experience of Tudjman and his colleagues with Bolshevik methods. There was no experience with Bolshevik organization at all, however; it was simply that the program that we presented—following the tradition of Starcevic, Radic, and the Croatian left—spoke in a language that Croats could feel and hear within themselves. Accordingly, in part of the homeland, from Osijek to Dubrovnik, Cakovac, Pula, etc., we encountered such a reception among the people that we cannot meet the demand for establishing branches. The same is true of the rest of the world. This was by no means any sort of organizational scheme planned in advance, but rather a program that created an organization of its own accord.

### Tearing Down Spiritual Walls

[VJESNIK] What is the actual substantive attractiveness of the HDZ's program, in your opinion?

[Tudjman] The fact is that the Croatian program is also a democratic program at the same time. I would even go so far as to say that it is the most Croatian and most democratic program! That is the essence of the matter—

we tried to extract all the positive experiences of Croatian political history. It is historically well known that certain figures and certain movements meet the challenge of a given time, and if they do not succeed in overcoming their own starting points, they usually fail in different circumstances. That happened in turn with Starcevicism, Radicism, and the Croatian left. Now we are seeing that there were extremely positive elements in all of them, but there were also negative elements. All those three components of recent Croatian history made an enormous contribution, and have value. We do not want to represent any kind of eclecticism, but to create something new from all of that. That means that we also want to have the idea of Croatian historical state rights, as one of the oldest peoples (today when nonhistorical peoples, unknown until yesterday, are appearing on the world scene); we want the democratism of Radic, and the decisiveness of the Croatian left in realizing the idea of a free sovereign Croatia, and the idea of a social state, which turned out to be a monstrosity in the sense of a socialist one-party state; that, however, does not mean that it has been discredited as in the idea of the kind of social-welfare society that European Marxism has realized in the form of social democracy. In this regard, it is particularly important that we have begun to tear down the spiritual walls between emigre Croatia and the Croatian homeland, as well as the spiritual walls within Croatia itself, between different generations and different political orientations. We feel that—if you wish, also as a result of my historical views and books, discussions, etc.—it is high time to face the fact that during World War II the Croatian people were in a historical position in which they could not avoid that division into the NDH [Independent State of Croatia] and the partisans. At the moment when Yugoslavia fell apart, an enormous majority of the Croatian people perceived that as a way out of the subordinate position that they occupied in monarchist Yugoslavia.

[VJESNIK] There are views that the HDZ is using Starcevicism and Radicism as an ornament, but is actually following the line of the Marxist left, and in that connection the HDZ is usually described critically as a Bolshevik organization. How would you comment on this?

[Tudjman] The very fact that they are using the term "Bolshevist" indicates a malicious approach that is directly serving not only to discredit the HDZ, but also to try to block the kind of program that the HDZ has, because if there was anything at all that was characteristic of the Croatian left, it was the anti-Bolshevism of its methods. It was thus revisionist precisely with respect to Bolshevik methods, from the Croatian left of the 1920's—Krljeza, Cesarec, Kamilo Hrvatin, Ciliga, etc.—through Krljeza, to Tito. And Tito, no matter how much he was a Marxist-Leninist, and in a certain sense even a Stalinist, could never be described as a "rigid Bolshevik," as some opposition members say. Attributing Bolshevism to us is part of a scenario that is not appearing here by accident.

#### Neither Interlocutors nor Opponents

[VJESNIK] What is the intention, the nonaccidental nature, of that scenario?

[Tudjman] To Belgrade, we are neo-Ustase; to such Croatian exhibitionists and underlings we are Bolsheviks; and to official politicians, we are nationalists. All of that is a single scenario that cannot accept the kind of Croatian orientation that says that it has to be based on the Croatian state's historical rights, and on the democratic traditions of the Croatian people, including the demands of the Croatian left. Accordingly, all those factions that for ideological or manipulative reasons are not in favor of such a development in Croatia are against the HDZ and against Tudjman, because through a conjunction of historical circumstances, only Tudjman was able to present such a program and stand behind it, so that it was then accepted among the Croatian population, not only by former communists and Marxists, but also by a very broad range of intellectuals and ordinary people from Catholic circles, Radicist ones, etc.

In contrast to Cicak, I can say with full historical responsibility that three Radicists came to see me, who were also proponents of that HSS [Croatian Peasant Party] tradition. They said that they wanted to separate and that they wanted to found a Croatian Republic Peasant Party and to offer to cooperate with us.

But let us go back to that criticism about a lack of democracy in the HDZ. The group that dropped out of the founding group dropped out through a democratic discussion. At two meetings, on 2 and 11 June, before our founding assembly on 18 June, there were a total of nine out of 35 people, and 10 out of 54, respectively, who were against the concept that the "Tudjmanists" presented, that we should aim for a founding assembly. In a very democratic discussion, they remained in a minority. When we decided to aim for that assembly, a day and a half before it the police banned us from holding a public meeting, since they had not been able to interfere with our founding it from within. We therefore could not go to a founding assembly in a nonpublic place with people who opposed such a program and to founding the party at this point in time. I think that history has shown that we were right, and that we were even a little late in founding it. Now the number of HDZ members is some kind of proof of a lack of democracy to all those leaders whose mouths are full of "democracy." It is really regrettable that we do not have any serious interlocutors in the struggle for democracy or any serious opponents in the sense of a political struggle of ideas. We will meet immature exhibitionists and the people who have already played their role from 1971 until now.

[VJESNIK] Many people interpret the conflicts among the opposition, including the schism among the founding group of the HDZ, as a conflict of leaders' ambitions.

[Tudjman] I do not think that is the reason at all. I have not seen any figures who would represent something like that, either in terms of programs, or personally. I did not

even have any intention of returning to political life, but I did it because I was persuaded to, at the time when it was historically necessary to present some sort of program like that.

#### No Divisions in the HDZ

[VJESNIK] It has been mentioned that you returned to political life at a birthday party for the Veselica brothers, where you were designated to carry forward the initiative for founding the HDZ, since Marko Veselica was banned from public appearances.

[Tudjman] That is absolutely wrong and historically untrue. It is true that in that circle—Veselica, Susic, etc.—they held regular weekly dinners with roast lamb, roast pig, etc., and also promotions for some sort of books. They even held funeral dinners to which 200 people were invited, while Marko was still in prison. Those were obviously occasions for drawing up lists for the police. I did not want to attend all those meetings, nor did I. I worked on founding the organization without that circle. When I was invited once to that happy gathering and when I responded, because they sent me a serious person who had been a defender of mine, I did not say anything at all about what we had undertaken or where we were, because I knew that in such company there are always people before whom it is awkward to talk about and discuss serious matters. There are people to whom I presented an alternative in the fall of 1988: the situation was such that we in Croatia had to do something. There was a dilemma over whether to try to revive MATICA HRVATSKA [Croatian Center] or formulate a party program. Some people felt then that the regime at that time would perceive a revival of MATICA HRVATSKA as a renewal of the MASPOK [Mass Movement] and an antiregime organization, and would immediately swoop down on us. The opinion was expressed then that we should go ahead with an alternative program, but without any of us who had been in prison. We did not talk with Veselica's group, because we felt that there were people there with whom it would be inadvisable to have serious talks. Appreciating Marko Veselica's sacrifice, however, and seeing that he was moving in company that was taking him away from serious work, I proposed to him that I arrange for him to work on an economic study of the present economic situation in Croatia and of further prospects. He agreed to work on it together with his brother, Vlado Veselica. They received advances for the project under terms that were unusual for our circumstances. There has not been any manuscript, however... Unfortunately, there was no constructive contribution at all from that group, not even with respect to the creation of a stock company.

In this regard, it is interesting that the HDZ did not emerge in any sort of circle of Tudjman's friends. I created the HDZ exclusively on the basis of the program and the majority of the people who were actively involved in implementing the program and the organization. It is interesting that three to four new parties have already emerged from that group of seven. There

are no divisions within the HDZ, even though we do not agree on everything and there are different orientations.

#### Labels and Pressures

[VJESNIK] To what extent are the political police hindering the work of the HDZ?

[Tudjman] Any person who knows how to think politically can draw conclusions from the kind of labels that we in the HDZ have experienced. For example, where can one find serious political reasons for our being an Ustasa or Bolshevik organization? It is clear where that comes from. It is said that former secret police officers and sons of generals and secret police officers are members of the HDZ.... Those who were are the Croatian Marxists who came into conflict with the one-party system. Do we need to recall that one Tudjman was expelled from the party and had to leave his position as an institute director in 1967, thus paying him back for Rankovic? And it is well known how long my conflicts with hegemonism and unitarism have continued. Bakaric was ready to drive me out of the institute back in 1964 and 1965, when Rankovic even blocked my election to JAZU [Yugoslav Academy of Science and Art], and then Tito and Kardelj intervened with the words, "Leave Tudjman alone; he is the only one offering resistance to Belgrade hegemonism and unitarism in the theoretical-historical area." At that time some of the leaders of the present opposition parties were still writing en masse in their documents that they were Yugoslavs, and wanted to make a career in the one-party system—and now they dare to slander us. I do not see how certain underlings and corporals were greater democrats than generals or generals' children.

[VJESNIK] There has even been public mention of pressure from the SDB [State Security Service] against the HDZ; there has been talk about eavesdropping, summons for interviews, etc.

[Tudjman] The HDZ has actually been subjected to police pressures. While other opposition organizations considered the removal of the monument to Ban Jelacic and its return to Republic Square to be a cultural act, the HDZ clearly stated that the removal of the monument was an anti-Croatian political act, just as in the incidents when young Croatians were sentenced for singing the "Ustasa song" "LIJEPA NASA" [Our beautiful...]. That led to searches of our offices, etc.

[VJESNIK] I have the impression that you are avoiding an answer.

[Tudjman] No. I simply think that the police still carry the traits of that one-party system, in which everything was under surveillance, and it is logical that it will devote special attention to the HDZ. First of all they tried to ban me from public activity, and then banned a public founding meeting; until recently, they used to summon our people for questioning... We cannot avoid all that, even if we had a less clearly defined program, both Croatian and democratic, than we do.

**Against Centralization**

[VJESNIK] What is your opinion on the centralization of the police in Yugoslavia?

[Tudjman] We in the HDZ stated that we supported Markovic's commitment to a free market and a system of pluralist democracy. We also firmly stated, and will state, that we are against centralization, because it is fatal, and not just to the interests of Croatia. Do we need to recall that more funds leave Croatia for the underdeveloped areas than can be invested in the development of Croatia? Do we need to recall that almost a quarter of the population of Zagreb is not connected to the sewer system? Do we need to recall that Croatia cannot solve its vital problem of connecting Zagreb with Rijeka and Split? Do we need to recall that Croatia allocates less for culture and science than other republics to which it gives its funds, etc.? Accordingly, that centralization which Markovic is carrying out on the political level and partly on the economic level may cause a further deterioration in the situation, which is already unbearable, and which has led to the point where Croatia has had the largest number of people emigrating for economic reasons, a serious problem with the birth rate, etc. Consequently, we are decisively against centralism, because today, while Markovic is president, that centralization may even be tolerable, but what about when someone else comes tomorrow? We feel that the Croatian representatives in the federal bodies cannot deviate one step away from the 1974 Constitution, because even that Constitution does not satisfy Croatia.

[VJESNIK] What does satisfy Croatia?

[Tudjman] In our opinion, relations in Yugoslavia can be settled only and exclusively on the basis of a pure confederation. That means consensus not only on general issues, but also on all issues that can violate the sovereignty of a republic, and on economic and political issues. Look what has happened! Milosevic and Serbia violated constitutional regulations through the strength of their position, and through compromise concessions by the Croatian representatives, and partly by the Slovene representatives, as far as Kosovo is concerned. Croatia and Slovenia are not in the kind of position where they can use force, and so they have to secure themselves by means of constitutional provisions. That also applies to the rights of the federal police.

[VJESNIK] What further political developments do you expect in Yugoslavia? Is it possible to predict secession?

[Tudjman] Yes, secession is possible if relations develop in such a way that one people perceives only harm from remaining in such a community. At a time when Europe is being integrated as a community of peoples and their states, we are standing by the position that Yugoslavia can be organized only as a confederation in which each people has the right to decide of its own will whether it is in its interest to live in such a community. Only such a constitutional provision will prevent hegemonist-unitarist tendencies. As far as the future is concerned,

today people in the world are discussing the survival and collapse of Yugoslavia—just imagine. We have to look that situation in the eyes realistically. There are plans for the creation of a Greater Serbia within the framework of Yugoslavia and outside Yugoslavia, which would encompass three-fourths of Croatian territory. Historically, this is not just a question of different national identities, but also of the fact that individual peoples belong to different civilizations and cultural spheres.

**Issue of the Borders**

[VJESNIK] To what extent are the borders of the individual Yugoslav states jeopardized by the application of the confederal principle and its further consequences?

[Tudjman] Of course it jeopardizes them, because that AVNOJ [Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Yugoslavia] concept has already been violated by what was done in Serbia with Vojvodina and Kosovo, and also in a way by the Serbian intervention in Montenegro. On the other hand, that program, which is preached not only by Vuk Draskovic and Seselj, but also reflects Serbian plans from the last century until today that have never been as clearly and unambiguously expressed as today, also explains the historical significance of the HDZ's 29 November 1989 declaration. That declaration stated, with respect to such plans for the creation of a Greater Serbia, which are already being widely announced throughout the world, that the Croatian people could not be reduced just to the borders of today's Croatian Socialist Republic [SR], and that the problem of Croatia's historical and natural borders existed. That is not just a Croatian issue, but also an issue of European history and civilization. Geopolitical elements play a more significant role in the life of a people than all the political and ideological themes.

[VJESNIK] What actually are those natural borders?

[Tudjman] We did not want to get involved in explanations now. We stated clearly at the moment when AVNOJ Yugoslavia was violated and the plans for a Greater Serbia were created that the Croatian people was not just within the borders of the Croatian SR. Suvar, in particular, challenged us by stating that we were raising the issue of the borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and thus provoking a civil war. We are not provoking a civil war; we are only saying that if some necessary changes occur, they should be carried out democratically. We only reminded people that even under the present Constitution, Bosnia-Herzegovina is also a state of the Croatian people, and we are in favor of the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina deciding itself, by referendum, where its place is.

[VJESNIK] Do you believe that the Moslems are a nation?

[Tudjman] I discussed this in an interview for NASI DANI, and I can say that people in Bosnia-Herzegovina were satisfied with it. I said then that the historical circumstances were such that even in a Marxist country,

a religion had been declared a nation. That issue merits particular attention. Even from the standpoint of Islam, a Moslem nation does not exist. Such circumstances have been created in Yugoslavia that Moslems constitute a separate community both religiously and culturally, but more essential characteristics are needed in order to be a nation—language, territorial identity, historical destiny, etc. In that respect, there is not doubt about what most Moslems are.

[VJESNIK] What?

[Tudjman] We believe that the Moslems are an integral part of the Croatian nation, but such historical circumstances have been created that even for most Moslems, it is more profitable to declare themselves a separate nation. Historical development is open, however. The question of why the Moslem nation has not developed and what its real prospects are, in view of that real problem of a Bosnia-Herzegovina between Serbia and Croatia, requires a more careful discussion. It is interesting that there is no doubt that in history so far, and even in the most recent events, from the death of Mehmed Spaha in 1940 all the way up to what happened with Bijedic, Hamdija Pozderac, and Fikret Abdic as Moslem representatives, these are indications that attempts have been made, in accordance with Serbian myth and Orthodoxy, to deny the Moslems completely, to the point of destruction, on their own soil. There was a well-known theory at the end of World War II that Moslems should be given a deadline to convert to the "faith of their forefathers," or else there was no place for them. Then there was also Draza Mihailovic's World War II program, according to which the Serbian lands, Bosnia and Herzegovina, should be cleansed of their non-Serbian Catholic and Moslem population. Thus, even the Agrokomerc affair was exploited in order to prevent the perpetuation of the kind of federation that Serbian neoexpansionism has fought against and is still fighting against.

#### Serbs in Croatia

[VJESNIK] Are you very optimistic, on the eve of the Croatian elections?

[Tudjman] Yes, although we know that the size of an organization's membership is not the only essential thing for the elections. We do not have any illusions, however. We know that the election campaign will still be burdened, in a certain way, by obsolete relationships. For our part, we will do everything possible to keep the elections "clean," but since the LC and the Socialist Alliance still control not only a strong apparatus, but the media as well, the conditions for the election campaign are not equal. Nevertheless, the elections represent tremendous progress, and in my opinion, it will probably be necessary after the elections to hold new ones very soon, that will be democratic in the true meaning of that word. It is very important, however, that the progressive and antidogmatic forces within the LC have understood the spirit of the times.

[VJESNIK] How do you view the position of Serbs in Croatia?

[Tudjman] The only possible development for political relations with the Serbs in Croatia is the recognition of their full civil democratic rights, and thus also their national rights. One should not be deceived by the policy of the LC, which has given them positions in society incommensurate with their proportion of the population, wherever decisions were made about personnel and capital. Such a policy does not yield results. Serbs in Croatia should be given all their rights, and that position of ours is not just because there are also HDZ members among the Serbian population, but also because there are desires for the creation of a Serbian party that will cooperate with the HDZ. The HDZ is ready for such cooperation, and considers it certain, since the party is against any ethnic exclusivism. The HDZ supports absolute reconciliation and the seeking of coexistence; it is against all revanchism and against all inequality.

#### Belgrade Press Coverage of Croatian Policy Analyzed

90EB0333A Zagreb *DANAS* in Serbo-Croatian  
27 Feb 90 pp 18-19

[Article by Milan Jajcinovic: "The Truth in Isolation"]

[Text] *Defense of Extremism, Shot in the Head, A Dangerous Game of Poker, Their Banners Have Fallen, But They Are Talking About Democracy, The Shadow of the General Converted to Catholicism, Breaches of Even the UN Charter, They Are Giving Us Lectures on Democracy, But They Are Using the Methods of the Fascist Press, Madness Does Not Choose Its Victims....* If you thought this was about Beirut and the unrestrained whirlpool of religious intolerance, about the insane Azerbaijani rages, or even about the new attempt to destroy the rights of the blacks in the Republic of South Africa, you were wrong. It is about Croatia! That is, these are only titles of newspaper articles published in recent months in POLITIKA, POLITIKA EKSPRES, INTERVJU, VECERNJE NOVOSTI, and NIN by correspondents from Croatia.

In a number of articles with vague titles (like those we have mentioned) and in a number of definite ones (*A Call for Destroying Yugoslavia, The Door Is Being Opened to Tudjman, Jelacic Is Reviving PROSVJETA, The Malice of the "Experts" for "Serbian Affairs," Salt on Kosovo Wounds, Croatia Against Croatia, the "U" on the Forehead of the New Democracy, Who Has Isolated the Truth From the Croatian People...*) Croatia's current affairs are analyzed. Partly probably because of intellectual convenience, and partly to meet the demands of the present moment in politics, all Croatian reality has been reduced to a few upright supports. There are four such uprights—the attitude toward Kosovo, conditions in the Croatian League of Communists [LC], the position of

the Serbs in Croatia, and the newly established multi-party system—whose dissection is presumably meant to reveal the “pathological gene” of current Croatian politics.

To what findings have the correspondents of Belgrade newspapers come in their anatomical study? For them, there appears to be no dilemma any longer about this gene being present in the tissue of the party. The Croatian LC is termed a culprit whose guilt is unforgivable. First, it is thought, it permitted the “invasion of fascist vampires” arriving from the “Croatian spring,” it renounced Yugoslavism, it screened out the Serbs in Croatia, it leaned in the direction of the Kosovo irridentists, and it has become the Croatian national party. It is in the space marked out by these coordinates, then, that one needs to read what the correspondents of Belgrade newspapers are writing. That space, that is, is for them the “orientation framework.” And the most important thing about that framework is its functionality. That is why any conversation conducted in this connection as to what is true and what is false is pointless—since the “orientation framework” may not in fact square with reality, and yet be very functional.

Relying on their coordinates, the correspondents from Croatia have in the recent past been most preoccupied with the schismatic LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia] Congress, in particular the role of the Croatian LC at the congress and especially the reactions coming from those areas of Croatia inhabited by Serbs. Some of the villages one would never have heard of—Bobota, Pacetin, Trpinja, Brsadin—had it not been for the assembly and the language, the nighttime sessions of the congress, and, of course, the zealous correspondents. Following the nighttime sessions of the congress, opstina communist committees made themselves heard from Petrinja, Glina, Vukovar, Donji Labac, Knin, Podravska Slatina, and other cities and other towns which the reporters from Belgrade newspapers have carefully noted down. We have thus had the opportunity to read that in a meeting of the “New Vukovar” Basic Organization of the League of Communists, the largest in Vukovar, one member of the LCY, “revolted by the current policy of the Croatian party leadership,” said that “if Ivica Racan and Dr. Savka Dabcevic Kucar were candidates today, Savka Dabcevic would win, since her program was more Yugoslav than Racan’s is today.”

Petrinja and Glina are probably thinking along the same lines about “Racan’s party.” In Petrinja, the opstina committee of the LC concluded, and the correspondents devoted much space to it, that they are against a league of leagues and the policy of the Croatian LC Central Committee and that: “The fact remains that in the Croatian LC Central Committee and in Croatia in general the Serbs do not hold nearly as many positions as one would expect according to their share and according to their numbers. Which is not to even mention Serbs from Croatia in federal bodies and agencies.” In Glina, members of the LCY also expressed their doubts about the good intentions of the “party of reformist change.”

“How can a people,” asked the chairman of the opstina committee, “such as the Serbs in Croatia, which has been cut in half in war and revolution, be against the state for which it itself fought? I say it in public: as a Serb from Glina I am for the Communist Party of Croatia, but the way it was in 1941, not the way it is in 1990. The one in 1941 saved many Serbs from the knife, but this one today does not give us those guarantees.”

The Serbs in Croatia have the feeling that in its political metamorphosis the Croatian LC has left them to themselves, that it is trying to cut the umbilical cord by which they are tied to their parent nationality and therefore to Yugoslavia as well. The Croatian LC is assuring them that this change has been for their own good as well. But few believe it. The correspondents of Belgrade newspapers are doubting more and more that there are any such. A majority of them have taken up the role of defenders of the interests of the Serbs in Croatia. This has been evident for quite a long time now, and we have also seen it in the recent past. That is, a colleague from a Zagreb newspaper took issue with certain positions of the Petrinja Opstina Committee of the LC concerning the representation of Serbs in party and government bodies, offering figures on this, stating that two of the three candidates for the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee are Serbs. Immediately thereafter an article appeared by the Zagreb correspondent (who last year moved from BORBA to POLITIKA) in which he said that the Zagreb newspaperman had proclaimed the Serbs in Croatia to be members of a Fifth Column, and he referred to the citing of figures as counting heads (as though that was not what the Petrinja Opstina Committee of the LC was doing).

Following the Croatian LC Congress the cup was already near full, and the “divisive activity” of the delegates of the Croatian LC at the LCY Congress merely made it run over. The renunciation of power and the decision to recognize the multiparty system has been interpreted in most areas of Croatia where the Serbs are in a majority as a concession of the Communists to the “mass movement followers.” Even before that, the newspapers were full of Jovan Opacic, unnecessarily arrested because of the crime of speech, whom they would like to represent as a victim who is being tried simply because he is a Serb, not because of the stupidity of the state. Slavica Bajan on the other hand has been given the role of the “organizer of the pogrom against the Serbs.” The campaign surrounding Opacic and the hue and cry against Bajan have filled newspaper columns day after day. Once Opacic was released, there remained only Slavica Bajan, who is being massacred in the media even today. Which is probably why the correspondents from Croatia did not even note or comment on the statement by Dr. Bozidar Kulisic, initiator of the Independent Serbian National Party from Knin, that “Croatia is the state of the Croatian nationality and Serbia the state of the Serbian nationality” and that “Serbs cannot have two states,” i.e., that Slavica Bajan was “right in terms of the law of government, she just interpreted the requirement poorly.”



Croatia's reality, it seems, is quite simple for the correspondents, as well-known as their own pocket. That being the case, simplification is only a step away: what Slavica Bajan did not do has been done by Ivica Racan. In part voluntarily, in part out of fear. Immediately after the Croatian LC Congress we had occasion to read from the pens of Zagreb correspondents of Belgrade newspapers that the Croatian LC "consisted of markedly timid people," since in just a month it had bowed down before the opposition. And for days before that skeletons were presented from the closet of a number of party founders. Selectivity was not particularly in evidence. Thus, the motto of all the articles on the opposition in Croatia was this: "the mass movement in a new set of clothing." The message, then, was clear: the alternative is in the hands of Croatian nationalists, although in '71 many alternatives were on the other side, some were minors, and some are not even Croats. But even then a newsman who is a poet wrote that "there is a nauseous smell in the air" (without asking himself to what extent he himself had polluted it) as though it really was a question of a dirty invasion of "fascist vampires."

It is far from the case that the leaders of the parties in Croatia are "pet lambs." But neither are they all as people often would like to portray them, and in particular they are not "fascist vampires." They do, of course, include people of various kinds, including fanatics and extremists, but this still does not mean that the majority is like that, much less that they all are. In all those sortings out, the Croatian Democratic Community of Dr. Franjo Tudjman was represented as a party of extremists even before it was founded. As for its founding, we had occasion to read from the pen of the correspondents that "this kind of 'alternative' on the Yugo-political scene, transformed into a bloodthirsty Hyde Park, is experiencing its 'spring' in which the most aggressive opponents of Yugoslavia are stirring up all and sundry." The pretext for this kind of crude assessment was found in the speeches of Vladimir Seks and Hrvoje Hitrec at the presentation of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] in the Zagreb Writers Club. Seks, who belongs to the "harder" segment of the HDZ, said on that occasion that the LCY was the source of everything bad, that it was actually a *cosa nostra*, and that the present crisis is the last stage of the present system.

Hitrec on the other hand said during that presentation of the HDZ: "Here in Yugoslavia we have already had our Sudetenlands, our Anschluss, the Czech protectorate, we have also had our Fuehrer. The scenario is well known, the steps to follow are also well known." Following this event the correspondent wrote: "How is it possible that in socialist Yugoslavia, regardless of all the difficulties it is experiencing, fratricidal appeals and bloodthirsty slogans can be and are permitted in the name of some imaginary democracy." As the HDZ has spread, the criticism (that is the mildest hook it has met with) has multiplied. The newspaper allusion "Tudjman Among Us" was presumably supposed to suggest that now the Croatian Government is rehabilitating political sinners. Including even Tudjman, whose "general's rank was

taken away because of hostile activity." That this is not the truth is not important. But it is very startling and in keeping with the endeavor to present the picture that "national-chauvinistic parties" have flooded Croatia.

The newspaperman and poet already mentioned gave clear evidence of how far someone can go along the old Bolshevik track (not its exclusive property) in looking for the enemy when he asked: "And what do our democratic communitarians offer?" To which he answered: "That is something we heard long ago (many of the listeners are under the earth)...." The allusion is quite clear and leaves no room for doubt. This resoluteness without a shred of doubt of his own assertions is simply astounding. But it was evident even earlier. For instance, in connection with the establishment of Zora, when we had occasion to read that it favored dialogue, and that "there would be no dialogue only with those poor people who spend their lives proving to the white and other mice that there are no Serbs in Croatia." Also by declaring that the actions of certain colleagues "can hardly be explained even by subtle medicine," and then by making an incident of his case in the little cafe and by raising it to the level of "physical persecution of people whose politics are different" as though offering an answer to the question who sees white mice.

What reasonable person or indeed what person who is politically crafty today denies the existence of Serbs in Croatia? Only the extremists. We have recently had occasion to read—not only in Belgrade newspapers—a statement about the miraculous ethnogenesis or transformation of former Croats into Serbs (there really are none of that kind in Croatia!). It is also true that this new theoretician of ethnogenesis (his previous field was economics) is a member of the Croatian Democratic Community. But this still does not justify the view of those who see the entire party as just a gathering of Croat nationalists and chauvinists, radicals and Srbovoves. Following that logic, if by some chance in the upcoming elections the HDZ should win or receive a large number of votes, will all Croats who voted for the HDZ (and then even all Croats) be proclaimed nationalists, that is, Ustashis? The HDZ has the markings of a right-wing party, but one can only guess as to whether it will go still further right. But in a democratic society there must be room for both the right and the left, and above all for the law, which protects democracy and suppresses the extremes.

The intention is to portray the Croatian Democratic Community as exemplary of the multiparty system in Croatia. To use it to blacken the entire opposition. Above all, with the Serbs in Croatia and "honest Croats." Assertions have already appeared in the newspapers to the effect that "it would be difficult to find even one member, say, of the Serbian nationality in Croatia who would cast their vote for Veselica, Tudjman, Cicak, Holos, Goldstajn, Brozovic...." It is probably anticipated that "honest Croats" will behave similarly. That is, it is increasingly obvious that, presumably following the pattern in Kosovo, they are beginning to look for "honest Croats" in Croatia (for the moment,

they are led by Jakov Blazevic). After all, if the correspondents had cared who belonged to what nationality, then they probably would not have quoted a member of the Glina Opstina Committee of the LC who said: "I am a Croat. I come to Glina every day from Zagreb and use this occasion to tell you and convey a message from the people of Zagreb, ordinary people, Croats. You must believe me that they are not poisoned by evil ideas, that their thinking is not like that of the leadership." Of the member of the Petrinja Opstina Committee of the LC who believes that the Serbian Communists are not to blame for the break-off of the congress, that they do not represent a "dogmatic Stalinist force," that the Slovenian Communists are not innocent reformers, and that the positions of the Croatian LC Central Committee are a "true time bomb which has brought about ethnic division both in the Croatian LC and in Croatia in general," it was said that "only because of the situation at the moment in Croatia need it be said that he is a Croat by nationality."

It is, of course, stupid to even think that all Croats think alike and still more stupid to suppose that they should think alike. It is certainly the same with certain Serbs in Croatia as well. But now they are being driven in various ways to the point where they have to think alike about Kosovo. But the "real truth" can be offered only by "truth rallies" and the Belgrade media. The Zagreb media are certainly unreliable and "are concealing the truth." Which is why the correspondent wrote that the daily news program on Zagreb television began one of its recent reports from Kosovo with the assertion that "Albanian blood has been shed, while Serbian blood has not yet been shed." Allegedly, according to the correspondent, what other reporters hear those from Zagreb pass over in silence. They mention only the shouts "We want freedom," "We want democracy," but they do not let the viewers hear the slogans "Kosovo a republic, peaceably or forcibly," so that viewers of Zagreb television "do not know that the Albanian separatists are firing on policemen with automatic weapons, who are forced to change their bulletproof vests every day." So, Zagreb reporters do not know this, but he knows it, although he probably has never been to Kosovo (at least as a reporter), especially not now when there actually is shooting.

The text on the Zagreb TV news ended with the sentence: "As far as Kosovo is concerned, someone has isolated the truth from the Croatian people." So Kesman and Bozur should presumably hurry so that at one of the "truth rallies" they can report as soon as possible to the Croats and a segment of the Serbian doubting Thomases that they have been seduced by Croatian manipulators and "Serbian traitors and careerists" at Zagreb television. This article does not have an intention of that kind, that is, of leading the correspondents of the Belgrade newspapers onto the "right path." It is their right to think what they like and any way they like. This is no longer a question of ethics, but of perceptive apparatus. If they all see it the way they write it, then what they

write is the truth for them and a great number of their readers. And it always comes down to a few pictures. But when it comes to Croatia, this would mean that it is helping the "Albanian separatists," that new "Frankists" are making inroads, that the Serbs have been deprived of all rights like Indians driven onto reservations and placed under constant supervision, that the Communists are traitors to the Yugoslav and therefore also the Serbian interest, and that the Croats have no idea about all this—since someone has "isolated the truth" from them.

### Conflicts Between Croatian Human Rights Groups

90EB0333B Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian  
27 Feb 90 pp 20-21

[Article by Jasna Babic: "Between Old and New Big-wigs"]

[Text] "Given the choice between Josip Vrhovec and Ivan Zvonimir Cicak, I nevertheless choose the latter...." This, they say behind the scenes of the Zagreb opposition, is how Zarko Puhovski justified his refusal to take part in the work of the Committee for Human Rights and Democratic Freedoms, joining the man who once had been his political opponent.

That is, Socialist Republic Croatia, among the last in Yugoslavia, now even has two bodies concerned with human rights. On one and the same day, the Committee of the SAWP [Socialist Alliance of Working People] of Croatia was initiated, but so was the Croatian Society for Advancement of Human Rights of Ivan Zvonimir Cicak as an "alternative" to that "regime" body whose members, aside from prestigious newsmen and scientists, also include former political officials, Ema Derrosi Bjelajac, and Josip Vrhovec. Yet Zvonimir Separovic, chairman of the Committee for Human Rights and Democratic Freedoms, did not at the time react with a single word that would discredit his own forum, although the prestigious "UJDI-ite" [Association for a Yugoslav Democratic Initiative] has been naming in public and without beating about the bush several of its members as those who bear principal responsibility for creating a system which in and of itself is an act of violating elementary civil rights. It was only a few days ago that Zvonimir Separovic would update that old accusation in an attempt at a small private "shock" in the ranks of his own organization. By curious chance, something similar will also be happening at the same time in Cicak's Society, so that the seemingly opposed doubles, that of the "regime" and the "alternative" one, will be exposed quite clearly above all as an instrument of influence and—power. Separovic, an increasingly fierce democrat, would reproach his own committee for the same things as Puhovski, and in the Croatian Society for Advancement of Human Rights there would be skirmish over division of chairmanships, since a few days before the beginning of the election campaign it seems that even a minimum consensus rising above parties is simply not possible....

### Separovic's Shock

The last meeting of Separovic's Committee for Human Rights and Democratic Freedoms was dedicated above all to Kosovo. That is why members of the Pristina Committee for Protection of Human Rights, Zakerija Cana and Idriz Ajeti, were guests for the first item on the agenda. Then Ajeti hurried to catch a plane to Geneva, and Cana left the meeting at the request of Zvonimir Separovic. "It would be good for you to take a little walk, it is such a nice sunny day out today....," Separovic suggested to Cana.

Then the committee's secretary, Jasna Bigovic, distributed to the remaining members of the committee and to newsmen a document entitled "Report and Proposal for Reorganization" which had been written by Separovic, the chairman, and Milan Miric, vice chairman, as a conceptual outline of a new body for protection of human rights, since their sponsor, the Socialist Alliance, had been transformed into an independent political party.

"This would constitute a certain restructuring of the committee, and to achieve this, I propose to you that we form a committee with an expanded presidium that in addition to the two of us (the chairman and vice chairman) would also include, say, three members whom you would propose. Second, I think it would be good for us to continue to think about having a committee that would be above parties, outside parties, and in order to ensure that, we would have to ask those who are or have been in the leadership structures of political organizations not in that case to be in this committee of ours," Separovic said, calling attention to the difficulties he had had because of the "regime" status of his organization.

"I last experienced that during that meeting in Stuttgart, when Cicak introduced himself as the chairman of the Croatian committee lighting candles in Republic Square, and me as the chairman of the establishment committee. I received a smattering of applause for this, a kind of half-applause, but the applause would have been loud if he had said that I am chairman of the establishment committee of which you are members," Separovic explained, letting it be known in a roundabout way that Josip Vrhovec and Ema Derrosi Bjelajac are above all compromising him personally.

Budisav Vukas was the first to ask for the floor: "If we want to be above parties, then there are other essential things besides whether someone is holding or has held a distinguished position. Positions are changing. Someone may be a small fish today in some party, but tomorrow it will evolve." Vukas, that is, had many more criticisms of the work of the committee itself than of its membership, noting that Separovic's forum was no longer concerned with Yugoslav politics, but with the reasons why it was established—individual cases of violations of human rights, which undoubtedly there were in spite of the altered situation. Separovic completely agreed with Vukas' criticism, and then he immediately returned to

the "shock topic," recalling once again Zarko Puhovski and his criticisms of the makeup of the committee. Josip Jovic came right back to Separovic, asserting that the makeup of the committee "even though there had been certain disagreements, was nevertheless constructive" and that in future the committee ought not to be "some association of citizens," but a body of the Community of the University and Academies. Then Milan Miric, coauthor of the report and proposal for reorganization and the new concept of the committee, finally changed his opinion. He withdrew his support from Point 3 of the Report... which would actually have expelled at least two members from the committee. But it was too late. Josip Vrhovec had asked for the floor.

### A Chain Reaction

He first reproached Separovic by saying that his document was "horribly burdened with insinuations" and that for him it was "simply unpleasant that this could be done by the chairman and vice chairman whom we have commissioned to organize our work."

"If we think that someone has in his 'baggage' great sins in violating human rights, then let us say openly exactly who that person is and state exactly what the violation of human rights was," Vrhovec said. "In one meeting of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, in order to refute the thesis of an unprincipled coalition, I put forth the counterthesis of an unprincipled anticoalition. I said that I did not see a coalition, but I did see an anticoalition, and that it was made up of specific forces, specific people, and they were directing it in the interest of a specific policy. Certainly, I could say something similar to that now.... Accordingly, as far as I am concerned, as of this moment I consider myself a nonmember of this committee," the former member of the Yugoslav Presidency concluded.

Then Milan Miric also presented his resignation, recalling that as coauthor of the Report... "he was drawing the consequences from all that," which brought from Separovic the laughing comment "What a chain reaction," and then Ema Derrosi Bjelajac also submitted her resignation. Academician Padovan coolly advised that "they sleep on all this," while Mustafa Cerić, imam of Zagreb and representative of the Islamic Religious Community, advocated that everyone work on the committee who wanted to do so. "There is such a thing as remorse," the imam recalled, "so perhaps penitents are more ardent than others, since they are familiar with the pangs of conscience. Perhaps it is in fact our advantage to have such people who want to reform and who in that way, in a moral sense, will offer compensation for the sin they committed toward another person." Separovic interjected at that point: "Some are incorrigible...."

Nevertheless, several members of the committee insisted that their colleagues withdraw their resignations, which Vrhovec vigorously refused "so long as this document still exists," and Academician Padovan proposed that both the resignations and the document be withdrawn. A

majority supported that. Even Milan Miric, one of its two authors. Thus, nothing was left for Separovic but to bow to the majority. Or to abdicate himself.

"Fine," concluded the chairman of the Committee for Human Rights and Democratic Freedoms. "The document will not be discussed any longer. I would ask the newsmen not to use it any longer; it has served its purpose, since a platform has been presented for possible transformation of the committee.... We will resume the discussion in another meeting. We need not bring this document, you can keep it in the back of your mind that this was the reflection of our founder, and you can reflect on it in that sense." So, that is how Separovic resolved the debate about the nonexistent document of a forum that actually did not exist, concluding yet another meeting of the Committee for Human Rights and Democratic Freedoms, a body which the public has become aware of for its several pronouncements related to Kosovo. After all, aside from Separovic's public statements on radio and television, the committee, after several meetings, seemed not to have done anything.

#### Cicak's Advancement

So, when Zarko Puhovski was choosing between Vrhovec and Cicak and chose the latter, he committed himself not only to the "antiestablishment" organization, but also the one that was more effective. The Croatian Society for Advancement of Human Rights, although it lacked an established sponsor such as the SAWP—and that means money, office space, and a professional administrator—had also produced certain specific results in the half-year of its existence. The attention which the Croatian Assembly had paid to amending the Law on Internal Affairs was the result of a campaign initiated by Cicak's organization, and we should mention above all as the greatest, almost historical, success of the Croatian Society for Advancement of Human Rights the drive to gather signatures for Human Rights Day, which, in some interpretations, actually overthrew the republic's one-party system. But if the crisis of the "establishment" Committee for Human Rights and Democratic Freedoms was brought about because Separovic's forum did not have the kind of prestige its chairman would have liked, then the problems of the Croatian Society for Advancement of Human Rights were on the other hand caused by its ever greater popularity. By virtue of its effective campaigns, the organization proved itself to be a powerful political instrument, and since Ivan Zvonimir Cicak, coordinator of its Initiating Committee, had in the meantime become vice chairman of the Croatian Peasant Party, there was every reason for a new issue to be raised in the founding assembly of that "alternative" organization, the only one in SR Croatia that stands above parties: Can the official of one political organization, which is certainly competing with all the others, be the leader of a politically "neutral" forum? In the conflict between the differing responses, here again there were demonstrative resignations which thereafter were withdrawn, stories about other people's past, democratic spirit, and exclusiveness.

Ivan Zvonimir Cicak says that Danijel Ivin and Slobodan Budak had agreed on division of power within the Croatian Society for Advancement of Human Rights in a meeting of the Initiating Committee which he had not attended. He was at that time outside the country, on one of his tours among Croatian emigres, whose votes and money the entire opposition is scrambling for. He was promoting his HSS [Croatian Peasant Party]. Which is why only Ivin and Budak, the former with the recommendation of his own legal profession, the latter as an independent politician outside parties who recently renounced the Croatian Social Liberal Alliance, were the only candidates to emerge for the leadership roles in the society. After all, although the bylaws adopted for the Croatian Society for Advancement of Human Rights guarantees the right of all members to elect and be elected to the "governing bodies" of the organization, certain representatives of parties—the Social Democrats were the most vocal—advocated restrictive application of these provisions of the bylaws.

"It is a matter of elementary decency and good taste that the officials of any party not be nominated and not be elected chairman of an association like that one," Antun Vujic, president of the SDSH [Social Democratic Alliance of Croatia], declared for DANAS.

On the contrary, "restriction of the right to be elected does not square with the bylaws," said Ivan Zvonimir Cicak, who in the end was after all promoted to be the leader of the society, if not altogether in open fashion, then undoubtedly thanks to his own skill at maneuvering. That is, witnesses say: since he was not on the list of candidates for the chairmanship, Cicak, as on similar occasions some 20 years ago, renounced the honor of the chairmanship from the speaker's stand, reminding people of his existence. And indeed, it was only when he made his statement that he did not want the leading role that someone recalled the indubitable credit owed him for the very existence of the Croatian Society for Advancement of Human Rights. In short, Cicak became chairman, Ivin vice chairman, and Budak, formerly Cicak's lawyer in one of the numerous political trials after 1971, dropped out altogether. Rightly so, Cicak's followers say today. He has a bad past, he was public prosecutor, and recently in the Committee for Coordination of Opposition and Alternative Parties he called for weapons so as to defend the sovereignty of the Croatian state with force. But neither is Cicak faultless, others say, recalling the methods of his "university followers" in dealing with their political opponents. What is more, the newly elected chairman of the Society for Advancement of Human Rights committed an unforgivable gaffe the other day. He misinformed the public about the release of Adem Demaqi, the "Yugoslav Mandela."... That is why some people say that because of Cicak as chairman the number of activists in the Croatian Society for Advancement of Human Rights has dropped to almost half, while others say that they are equally numerous and interested in Cicak's future initiatives. Once again it is difficult to ascertain where the

truth lies. There remain, then, only general observations: Shouldn't the bylaws have stipulated that an organization above parties would actually remain above parties thanks to guarantees governing its representative offices? After all, Cicak differs from Separovic only in being a much more skillful "player."

Thus, Croatia, with its two organizations allegedly concerned with human rights, has none at this moment. Even in the pluralistic republic political and ideological battles are at present more important than the citizen and the individual, so while those who were once victims of revolutionary law are today fighting for power, positions, and influence, those who were once "members of the establishment" and have now been relieved of power are actually concerned with the problems of civil liberties. So in the twilight of his career the controversial Vrhovec has nevertheless raised the issue of solitary confinement in Kosovo and supported the demands for reassessment of Andrija Hebrang's "crime."

Should he be forgiven, then, as a "penitent," as the imam of Zagreb proposes, or should he be branded forever, as the former politician once did to his own subjects? Not only the fate of the two forums for protection of human rights, but also the content of the future democracy appear to depend on the answer to that question.

#### **Slovene LC CC Secretary on Kosovo, Elections**

90EB0334A Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian  
27 Feb 90 pp 13-15

[Interview with Sonja Lokar, Slovene League of Communists Central Committee Secretary, by Jelena Lovric; date and place not given: "Splitting Hairs on the Left"—first paragraph is DANAS introduction]

[Text] Sonja Lokar on the Yugoslav political tragedy, on the making of world history at the party congress, on Gandhi's methods in resolving the Kosovo problem, and on uncertain elections.

Sonja Lokar became imprinted in the minds of the Yugoslav public because of the tears that she could not conceal that night when the disintegration of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia [LCY] took place, a development that was not unexpected, but was nonetheless painful for some. But long before that acknowledgement of emotion, the young and energetic woman had impressed others with her intellect. On Kucan's team, carrying out the alchemy of transforming the old party into a new one, and now in the post of secretary of the League of Communists of Slovenia, which, to emphasize the change, has gained an appendix to its name: Party of Democratic Transformation. Sonja Lokar has acted as a modernized version of former members of the League of Young Communists: with a respectable dose of energy and authentic simplicity which she combines with the possibly feminine traits of openness to whatever problems she approaches and good will towards whatever people she deals with.

DANAS: You recently said that all the questions concerning the survival of socialism were raised at the 14th Congress of the LCY. Would you like to explain that?

Lokar: I think that our congress posed all the essential questions of socialism, but that not one of them was resolved. Our country, such as it is, is actually the world in miniature, as if it has been cursed; in it are contained all the world's differences and intermixtures, all the winds of the world blow here, all of its civilizations, except for the Chinese and Japanese, have crossed here. Resolving this enigma and turning all of it into something that can survive normally and in which we can live normally means resolving the problem of the world. Through our congress, of course, and often in an erroneous and even monstrous manner, this very fundamental question of the modern world was broken into two. In addition, the majority of the participants there were not at all aware that world history was being made at that moment, but we did it nonetheless. I don't think that we are really the focal point of the world; we can complicate our situation ad nauseam and fail to resolve anything, or we can perish in some unnecessary war, but that is because of the very same problems that the world is resolving. Suddenly, we are facing all of them: the question of man and his rights and possibilities, interethnic relations, relations among different civilizations and cultures and between the different historical phases being experienced at the same time by, say, Ljubljana and Pristina.

DANAS: There are those who think that it is precisely for that reason that our country is an impossible creation and that its disintegration is the only logical solution.

Lokar: I have disagreed with that position for some time now, for a very simple reason: That was the type of country we were in 1945, and nevertheless peace has prevailed and the people have lived relatively contentedly for 40 years in this part of the planet, which has always been racked by war and killing. I won't say that everything has gone smoothly, and perhaps there was even the illusion that we loved one another, but compared to how we used to despise each other in this region, these years have been unparalleled. This means that it is possible to create such a country, in which it is possible to live despite all these differences.

DANAS: How? In leaving the LCY, your party organization, for example, is being accused of being more concerned with its internal problems than with common problems.

Lokar: You can't leave something that doesn't exist. And the League of Communists of Yugoslavia ceased to exist at the moment at its congress when it put itself into a situation where it could not sustain the gathering. That is a statement of fact. Despite that, we do not deny the possibility that the LCY will be organized again, but for us it is impossible to return to the organization and continue as if nothing had happened at the point that would be called the Third Plenary Session. We wonder

who would have the guts to behave that way. We have not closed the door to the possibility of joint action, and perhaps even a joint organization. But when we say that for us the LCY no longer exists, this means that our starting point is no longer what it was, but rather the new situation that implicitly implies that in the former LCY no one has the possibility of clearly defining his position any longer. And then it will be seen whether we can approach these differences by being a unified organization in terms of program, while leaving plenty of room for diversity, so that it is neither uniform nor monolithic, and most of all that it is not an organization that forces you to lose elections in order that all that will quickly happen to those who are urging you in that direction today for reasons of prestige. Yesterday, it was still possible to avoid that by hiding behind the image of some compromise, some domestic tranquility that will seemingly save this country from ruin. It has been demonstrated that that very thing is the road to ruin.

DANAS: How do you respond to the charge that by leaving the congress you saved yourself from the threat of your own breakup, but that you would not have devoted the same amount of initiative and energy to preventing that on a federal level?

Lokar: In the existing situation, that was the only possible move for us in order to remain consistent with the line of social development and transformation in the very League of Communists that was affirmed as the proper one in the life of Slovenia. Because in keeping with this line, we are a unified communist organization in the world that likes to call itself socialist, that has succeeded in using constitutional changes and laws to execute a gradual, reformist passage from monism towards political pluralism, or from the party state to the rule-of-law state. The essential question remains of whether we will succeed in moving from a closed, agreed economy to an open, market economy that is nevertheless concentrated on man and his labor. We have scarcely begun this battle, let alone won it, and it will show us how worthwhile these steps forward into democracy are to us, steps that are not small ones. I believe that the small core of the new democratic Yugoslavia already exists throughout Yugoslavia. It has yet to emerge victorious even in Slovenia, it is only an illusion that we have achieved homogenization in this. The validity of our social consensus on democracy will be seen in issues concerning the economy. This cannot be measured in other areas, or rather cannot until questions are raised about employment and the achieved level of social standards, on which education, health, and a peaceful old age depend. Whenever that question is raised—and in Slovenia that moment is already approaching—there will be a new balance of power, and it will no longer be crucial whether political parties have managed to agree among themselves what the assembly system will look like; rather, the dominant question will be how the people will react when they lose that which was guaranteed to them only yesterday. Will they react with disorderly strikes as in Poland, or will they start a mass revolt

against communism as in Romania, or will there develop a secessionist movement that can end no other way than in a foolish, adventurist illusion? We do not have the answers to these questions. Just as we do not know how we will delay the pace of reform when all of this bursts forth, threatening to use its force to push things back to an undetermined time, burying our movement to reform socialism.

DANAS: But why did you so decisively slam the door shut on the possibility of the congress continuing?

Lokar: The answer to that is not a simple one, because it involves the very complex dynamics within Slovenia itself and within the League of Communists of Slovenia. Even at the congress, one could see in our delegation how the internal currents react stormily. Although the main strategic direction was adopted, it could even be said with excessive unanimity, the questions of tactics are so strained that this is threatening to lead to organizational ruptures. Thus, we had to be very careful in determining at what pace to move in order to preserve the main direction of our political orientation, while at the same time not threatening the democratic processes in Yugoslavia nor disrupting the reformist unity of our own organization. After the congress, the party members, in backing us up, demonstrated a great deal of awareness in demanding that we by no means presume to become a small provincial party that drowns its national memory in tears while Yugoslavia and the world change their paths. At the same time, it was clearly emphasized that we could become an obstacle to them if we become so self-important as to suggest that we are the only ones who have any knowledge of democracy. It has been demanded of us that we close off the doors to the LCY as it was, but not as front runners, but rather that we build something new on an equal footing with all the forces that adopted a democratic position at the congress. This awareness, as a key criterion, also guided us at our conference, when we said that for us the LCY no longer exists, but at the same time we initiated a call for a round table of all democratic forces in the Federal Assembly of Yugoslavia in order to open up the road to a democratic passage from monism to pluralism. This also inspired our desire to strengthen our ties with leftist forces in the world, especially in Europe, whereby we have no illusions whatsoever about the fact that the world is not waiting with open arms for a small breakaway Slovenian organization; rather, it needs a serious, leftist political interlocutor in Yugoslavia, one that has yet to be formed. Obviously, the old party was not that, and the new one is still in its infancy.

DANAS: Do you feel isolated in Slovenia?

Lokar: It seems to me that part of our party membership has lost that feeling—for me the most normal one there is—of thinking not only about our own region when making any move, but also about its repercussions in Yugoslavia. But that is the case not only in Slovenia. In our republic, it is particularly pronounced among young members who have not experienced the LCY as an entity

with a positive charge; rather, they have evaluated it on the basis of what it has been for the past 10 years, and the things that have weighed down on them have not given them breathing room, forcing them to adopt conformist behavior and not to deal with true problems. The youth in our region are not as closely linked to the LCY in part because it has been 10 years since the youth organization became independent, so that they already have the experience of being able to be a political factor even though they are not in the party. For them, the interruption of the congress was like liberation: The burden was lifted from their shoulders, and now they can build something from the bottom up. Although they feel that there was no alternative, all of this was a heavy blow to our older comrades. Everything that they have been building for 40 years was torn down. I believe that they are utterly shocked that the disintegration of the party was not accompanied by the disintegration of the state. The middle generation, to which I belong, was not afraid that the state would founder, but we were tormented by the feeling that we had jointly missed our big chance to realize that which would have been of the greatest benefit to society, namely, that the changes be carried out organically, not through severing ties.

DANAS: That stratification could also be evidenced by the fact that on the first day of the congress, after the voting on the Declaration, it was in fact Slovenian delegates of the older generation who warned of the need to be careful that the proponents of that option, which then lost, not feel wronged.

Lokar: In the eastern part of the press, and even in political circles, there is a great deal of discussion about the malicious Slovenian scenario that was implemented organizationally, with great attention to detail. The truth is much more tragic. No one talks about a well-staged plan, but rather about that which can be seen, say, in a Greek tragedy: It is clear from the outset what will happen, the hero does everything he can to keep it from happening, and each further step of his involves him even more in the very tragedy that he wanted to avoid. But I think that that situation was not our fault alone. There were moments—not only public ones, but also at internal meetings—when that awareness of the tragedy of the situation could be felt even among us as people. Because it was anticipated that the comrades from Serbia were aware that the future lies in that which we are proposing, but that they felt that we were hurrying things along too much, and wanted to slow us down. We knew that they could not deal with all this over night, but at the same time we could not wait a second longer. That is why we demanded that this first step be taken, from which the direction of the process would be clear. But then there came the moment for prestige, when people were no longer deciding about problems but rather got caught up in the trap of their past political action, whereby if they did not behave in accordance with that, they would lose credibility in their own region.

DANAS: Initially after the interruption of the congress, it seemed that the situation was developing better than could

have been expected. However, it turned into negative pushing, and now the situation is fluctuating from day to day.

Lokar: The beginning of the congress was too good, with the majority agreement on the Declaration, and it appeared that those who defend the status quo were frightened and became unyielding towards each of our proposals, rejecting all of them. The same situation repeated itself after the congress. When it was seen that the old organization was over and done with and when everyone had to clearly define his own position, the majority did so very courageously. In all likelihood, the process would have gone even faster if there had not been the escalation in Kosovo, which the dogmatist option used as an alibi to keep the breakup of the congress from progressing towards that option's definitive defeat. What more will come of this? Democracy cannot develop under conditions of civil war. I think that at this time it is up to the Albanians to decide what will become of this country. Right now, the fate of Yugoslavia depends on the courage and determination of the majority of Albanians to prevent violence against those who are in the minority, to neutralize their own extremists, and to force this country to accept them as partners in the democratic process. Everything depends on whether they will feel, either for their own sake, for the sake of Yugoslavia, of Europe, and of Albania, compelled to do everything to struggle for their rights in a way that can lead to a positive outcome. Because we can say whatever we want, but the autonomy of Kosovo has been nullified. I think that at his moment signing a call for dialogue strengthens the position of the democratic forces, while riots and bloodshed do not lead in that direction. Democracy in this country will be established or will falter on this point. This is not a very optimistic conclusion, because thus far there has been little impetus for the Albanian majority to articulate itself as being democratic, with a majority sentiment in favor of Yugoslavism. Slender is the thread on which our fate hangs.

DANAS: But how is it possible to expect that they will demand dialogue and sign appeals while they are being forced into second-class citizenship, while they are being harassed and murdered?

Lokar: When I look at this, I always remember the scene from the film about Gandhi when the English soldiers beat the Indian rebels, and they stand lined up, waiting for the blows. In the end, this enormous mass in peaceful protest against violence exhausts and morally breaks down the perpetrators of the violence, who are no longer able to lash out once they see that they are not in the right. That is the most difficult course. I don't know if that is possible here, because even India had more than just Gandhi's movement, it also had bloody killing between religions, and it is not free of that even today, but at the time that was their means of struggle. I believe that there are many people in Kosovo whose life experiences have led them to this type of consideration.

DANAS: What is your assessment of the growth of Slovenian nationalism?



Lokar: It's clearly there. But it's not something else. Those who find fault with us for the escalation of nationalism not infrequently are simply mixing everything together in one pot—and are doing so, I'm afraid, intentionally—so that the things that are the excesses of minority groups are represented as the official policy of the League of Communists of Slovenia, which has never been true. While we have been involved in very sharp political conflict with the supporters of the idea of primitive Slovenian nationalism—and it is becoming greater every day—at the same time it has been imputed that we support that idea. I am certain that not one iota of nationalism can be found in our program texts. There is some defiance there: If we cannot democratically change Yugoslavia together, then we will change ourselves, regardless of everything else. That position exists, but it cannot be confused with nationalism. It is a defense of that which we have achieved with great difficulty, and we will not allow anyone to destroy that, knowing that our fate and that of the entire country depends on it.

DANAS: What do you think about the assessment that you, together with Serbia, are the most homogeneous republican party organization?

Lokar: I think that it is possible to say that the membership, almost without exception, thinks that the strategy that we have chosen is correct. But on questions of tactics, concerning every concrete problem, there are tremendous arguments, which has also not been unusual since we opened up free debate and did away with democratic centralism. There are other problems in other areas. I think that in Croatia to some extent there has yet to be a definitive decision on the conceptual dispute...

DANAS: Right now, interethnic divisions are in the foreground.

Lokar: That is only the form in which the conceptual differences are expressed. Or a brilliant excuse to avoid recognizing their natural rights. Because you are always in a legitimate position when you defend the nation. It is more difficult when you defend a concept. But it is still a very long way from our current agreement concerning strategy to where we are an organization not threatened by instability and featuring the internal balance needed by every mature political party. At the moment, we are undergoing a reorganization that got rolling when the law on political association stipulated that we had to give up state organs, and then enterprises, in three months. Right now, that snowball process is already somewhere around the middle of the hill, and we are in a race with time to adopt new forms of organization so that the membership does not disperse entirely. According to political-science criteria, the strong party is the one whose members comprise more than five percent of the electorate. We are somewhere around that. We still have a little maneuvering room, but in order for us to be an important social force we cannot shrink into a tiny sect. But now something is happening to us for the first time in a long time: New members are requesting membership applications,

which is a big deal for us, having only lost members for years now. But if we do not tell them right away what we will be doing in this new organization, then they will come and go. But they could raise our organization to a higher level, not through their numbers, but through their quality.

DANAS: This will presumably be accompanied by the establishment of some new party identity; up to now, it has been an amorphous and inert mass. In this regard, I am interested in the question recently posed to you at a press conference: What will you be called in the future, communists or socialists? Renewers, you responded. I bring this up not because of the name, but because of the party definition.

Lokar: I think that we have a good response to that question for those who are already party members, but a somewhat worse one for those who are just potential members. For the current membership, there is a rather strong point of identification of us as an organization that through its work in society is guaranteeing a peaceful transition from monism to pluralism. Because they know that they could be the victims of a possible process like the one in Romania. For those who are coming in, this is too little. For them, the point of identification is that we are an organization that is actually guaranteeing the implementation of reforms. Because others have similar proposals, but the question is whether they have the same level of conviction. These new parties, which are still quite young, are nonetheless old enough that at some critical moment they could demonstrate greater maturity, and many people who were initially delighted with them as something new and encouraging are already showing skepticism. With increasing frequency, I am hearing the following thought: The communists have made mistakes, but in recent times they have shown that they have learned something from this. What will happen if the new political organizations now set out to learn their political ABCs at our expense?

DANAS: What are your prospects in the elections?

Lokar: The elections are still a long way off, and it is difficult to predict. In crisis situations, it is not weeks or months that matter, but rather days. All sorts of things can change before the elections. I don't think that all the capital that we have created can miscarry, but it could be that the electorate, tired of the crisis and everyday chaos, will react emotionally. Because it has not been stabilized. But if nothing dramatic happens, I think that people on all sides will realize that regardless of who wins, the situation will continue to be very difficult and we will need a great deal of strength, close ties, and tolerance. The opposition is aware that it has no people who know how to govern society, and the party is aware that those people whom it has are not good enough that it could govern with them alone. Thus, it is clear to everyone that after the election there will be some sort of coalition that by joining forces will try to pull the car out of the mud into which our wheels have sunk. And until the elections, as is customary in democracies, there will be divisions on the



both the Left and the Right. Demonstrations, a united opposition, a rickety coalition; it is normal that there will be haggling about who will occupy what post. But for our part, things will be no better. It is already clear that strained relations are developing between two organizations that are otherwise very similar in terms of program, the socialists and the communists. It would be nonsense to turn this into a major quarrel among the Left, but it cannot be denied that there is competition for cadre and tension. We are not talking about tensions relating to program and concepts, but rather normal preelection competition.

DANAS: To what extent could that weaken the Left's chances?

Lokar: There is a lot that could do us harm. Because as we know from history, the Right has never won because it was strong, but rather because the Left was stupid, and because splitting theoretical hairs was more important to it than social processes. If this happens to us again, with splitting up the cadre instead of theoretical hairs, then we could repeat history.

DANAS: I wonder why your leftist front does not include, for example, the Greens, who would be natural members of it.

Lokar: There is nowhere in the world where Greens or farmers, for example, have always been only leftists or only rightists; rather, they are divided among themselves. An analysis of the new social movements shows that options that are politically very antagonistic are grouped under the same slogans about solving social problems of importance to all people, such as a clean environment, health, or the question of human rights, and that in the Green movement, for example, there are groups whose point of reference is conservatism and those whose characteristic feature is humanism. I think that in this sense, we share the fate of Europe. With the qualification that our structures are even more fixed, since they are stifled by the overextended industrial type of development, which in some sectors has strengthened the forces of conservatism. In this sense, we have to a considerable degree fallen behind as a party. Moreover, regardless of these party structures, the elections could be decided by the 70 percent of the voters who say that they do not belong to any party, nor do they want to. They simply reject any sort of party manipulation on their own, and hold on to their right to decide using their own head. If they do not abstain, if they turn out for the elections, then I am not at all afraid of the outcome. Because whatever they decide, it will be good.

#### **Life, Ideas of Kosovo Political Prisoner Demaqi**

90EB0333C Zagreb DANAS in Serbo-Croatian  
27 Feb 90 pp 22-23

[Article by Zorica Nikolic: "Personality of the Week: The Man on the Banner"]

[Text] Perhaps a better name for this department might be "Fabrication of the Week." The reference, that is, is to the misinformation about the supposed release of

Adem Demaqi, which was reported last week by all the Yugoslav newspapers, radio, and television, thus making him a kind of media star.

Nevertheless, it is not a question of a journalistic canard in the conventional jargon. It was Ivon Zvonimir Cicak who released this canard from his poultry yard, first in Stuttgart (in order to reach a European public more quickly), and then in Zagreb, in the Founding Assembly of the Croatian Society for the Protection and Advancement of Human Rights.

Since this occurred immediately after the statement by Idriz Ajeti, member of the academy and chairman of the Pristina Committee for Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms, before the Committee for Human Rights and Democratic Freedoms in Zagreb, to the effect that "we have our own Mandela, Adem Demaqi, who has been sitting in prison for some 30 years"—the circle was closed. Even the official denials about Demaqi's release from prison in Stara Gradiska could not halt the groundless enthusiasm of Albanian demonstrators in Kosovo, who celebrated Demaqi's "release" by shooting into the air.

To tell the truth, it should be said that this sensational news, while it was "in effect," brought a short-lived joy to all reasonable people: Adem Demaqi was of greater help and benefit to the Albanian separatists and chauvinists in Kosovo (not to mention those in Albania) as a "martyr" in prison than he would be as a free man. With the freedom which is now enjoyed by his fellow countrymen in that southern province of Serbia, which is "unified and strong" especially during the "curfew" with tanks in the streets, Adem Demaqi would be just one more name signed with his "rusty pen" on some petition of Albanian intellectuals, "verbal delinquents."

It is quite understandable, then, that neither Adem Demaqi nor his defense, we had occasion to read in the official notes of his prison file, have ever applied for his pardon. "I am not obstinate; if I see a mistake, I am ready to correct it, but since I am not guilty and know with whom I am dealing and who sent me here, it would be humiliating to beg anyone," he says in relatively good humor, even cheerful and smiling as he entered the room in the Stara Gradiska House of Criminal Correction that was set aside for the interview in the presence of a prison guard.

"Yugoslavia is my stepmother, and Albania my mother," Adem Demaqi says. Since, according to his own statement, he has never been to Albania, Adem Demaqi is caught up in the syndrome of a stepchild who has never seen "his real mother," but (precisely for that reason) he preserves for her the finest words of love and understanding: only the finest thoughts of Albania.

"So what if they do not have cars in Albania; they just pollute the air, destroy the forests, and consume petroleum, and people die like flies," Adem Demaqi meditates out loud about this "mother Albania." He prefers

to talk about Albania, where he has never been, than about the prisons in which he has spent 28 years:

"This is a hell which cannot be described in ordinary words, and I will not make it sound better than it is," he said, refusing to talk about the prison and adds: "Gir da gur, runs an old Turkish saying, go and see for yourself!"

The personality of the week would actually be the person who would answer his words by saying "My hearing is not good....," and would then grant him freedom, that Albanian freedom of his in which he "breathes more easily" since there are no automobiles to pollute the air. If not on political grounds, Adem Demaqi ought to be released and returned to his "mother Albania" on environmental grounds.... Let him go and see for himself!

In our country, which claims to be a law-governed state in which the maximum prison sentence is 15 years, and 20 years can be pronounced only as a substitute for the death penalty, Adem Demaqi has long ago been "in the other world" for his political crimes. If during all the time spent in prisons he had been assembling ballpoint pens as he is now doing in the prison workshop in Stara Gradiska, he would have no one in this world to write to with all those pens. Nevertheless, in prison he has not been busy writing, he told us. One day, when he leaves prison, he will go back, he says, to "his rusty pen."

His first three-year prison term, back in 1958, when as a 22-year-old student of world literature at the University of Belgrade he was convicted because of an attempt to establish an illegal separatist organization, he describes as his "coming of age," when in the prison at Sremska Mitrovica he mainly studied the works of Mao Tse tung.

When he left Sremska Mitrovica he was mature enough to establish the Revolutionary Movement for Unification of Shqipetars, and he landed in jail once again. At that time (1964), he was sentenced to 15 years. In the program which he authored in February 1964 ("when Rankovic was at the height of his power"), he wrote: our struggle will be a lengthy one. What he had in mind at the time was the "balance of power." It was there, he says, that he also wrote this: "We will make an attempt with all peaceful means, and if that does not succeed, then with nonpeaceful means." "Flight from Yugoslavia" was at that time the only solution in the "entire context that was so black and sinister, in which prospects for my people were closed off." That is to say, separation from the "stepmother Yugoslavia" and joining "mother Albania." They chose 13 April 1964, market day, to support that objective with a demonstration. They flew Albanian flags in Djakovica, Pec, Pristina, and Podujevo.... "We wanted to make the point," carried away in his monologue, he pounded the table with his fist, "that this is Albania."

And then Rankovic fell ("I could not believe it!"). Demaqi's sentence also fell from 15 to 10 years in a new trial which he did not attend. He realized "that there are certain forces which can do something in the sense of getting out of that bureaucratic situation." "We are

putting the objectives in the context of the times," "certain things can be worked out without bloodshed," "we are assessing the balance of power," "we began to take a broader view, not confining ourselves exclusively to the interest of Albanians."

He is no longer convinced of the need to join mother Albania. That demand has also evolved into the demand for Kosovo to be made a republic. He is not looking out "just for himself and his people," he thinks that "a solution acceptable to all can be found," but again the "bureaucratic-parasitic class" (since he sees a great difference between it and the Serbian people) is spoiling his vision, only now it is not in a Serbian edition, but an Albanian one.

His explanation of the genesis of his evolution sounds like a poem he has learned by heart: "My first political commitment was pure irredentism, based on Marxism, at least the Marxism we knew at the time. In the Rankovic period, times were hard for us Albanians. We were oppressed and did not have equal rights, and we wanted to realize at least a part of freedom by joining mother Albania. At that time, I formed an organization with 300 people. It was not difficult to get people together who wanted to fight for freedom. We were young and naive, we organized an underground when actually we knew nothing about it. We had spies in our ranks, so that everything we did one day the police would know the next...."

Nevertheless, even after he left prison the second time (on 8 June 1974 he left the House of Corrections in Pozarevac), his freedom was short-lived: He was arrested again (30 July 1975), indicted, and convicted for association against the people and state, and again he was sentenced to 15 years in prison (another 18 members of the group were convicted). The opinion supporting the verdict stated that the danger to society of Adem Demaqi's activity was great and that he was therefore being sentenced to the maximum term possible. Back in 1974 a hostile group of five members had been discovered in Kosovo; it was led by Kadri Osmani, a teacher from Gnjilane, and in 1975 a group with 33 members was discovered; this one was headed by Adem Rukiqi, a teacher from Glogovac, and during the investigation of this group it was established that Demaqi had been the principal initiator and ideological guide of these hostile organizations. Nevertheless, he did not admit his guilt at the time. It was true that Kadri's remnants (the group was arrested a month before Demaqi's release from prison) did hang around him, but "there was no question of an organization. They reached an agreement without my knowledge: 'Let's replace Kadri with old Adem!'" They did not, he says, let him defend himself, nor even accuse himself! "I saw that people like Rankovic were back in again, but the first ones had at least been professionals, they proved everything, and so even I myself confessed everything in the end." This was "trumped up," "Sloba is a piker compared to the old pros who used to rig trials."

He denies ("that is a rotten lie!") that he previously advocated putting pressure on Serbs and Montenegrins to move out of Kosovo until their number dropped to less than 10 percent. He says that he never advocated an ethnically pure Kosovo, "but if that happened, then the Serbs and Montenegrins would have Albania for a step-mother." But making Kosovo a republic, now that is another matter. Although then the Albanians, who are a nationality (with their mother Albania), were as such a unique case in Europe, both of them (both they on the one hand and the Serbs and Montenegrins on the other) "would have two mothers and no stepmother!"

He represents himself as a dialectician: "Everything is changing, developing. Everything is headed toward freedom. So, even the rays of that sun which is shining through the window while we talk in this prison are fleeing from that sun out into space." He would not be offended, but he would not like to be called a Marxist. He does not like that expression. "It has been watered down a lot, it has become greatly entangled. So, these people who are keeping me in prison are Marxists and I am a Marxist, so someone isn't!" He never, he says, had a high opinion of Stalin. "If I were to keep someone's picture, it would be Hegel's, I would not want Engels, Lenin, or Marx." He wonders what is the "heart of the crisis of the blueprint of so-called socialism." He finds the cause in the lack of respect for the will of the individual and the group, "and that is a necessity in the development of any society." And that will of the individual, the group, the people, has been mercilessly trampled on.

He sees the resolution of socialism's crisis in democracy, in respecting the wishes of the people. Even Gorbachev has adopted the projection of a multiparty system in order to free his country of brutality. With greater democratization, with elections, that would also resolve the problem of Kosovo in our country, the Albanians would then see Yugoslavia as their homeland, but certainly in Kosovo as a republic.

Demaqi, however, at the same time does not conceal his admiration for Enver Hoxha, "the greatest son of the Albanian people and a leader of genius," he respects him because he "created a country which has nothing to be ashamed of from backward Albania." And the will of the individual? "He (Hoxha) respected it to the extent that the conditions allowed."

"My fellow martyr Vlado (Gotovac—Z.N.), who is an expert on that, has written about life in prisons. I read him that, and I thought: Eh, dear Vlado, you do not know how fine that sounds!" But Demaqi stoically puts up with this "prison hell," and also the media fame, for which, when he had the visit from the journalist, he missed his lunch. After the long years of hungering for publicity, that day he certainly was glad to go without his food.

Only it is not clear to us why journalists are not allowed to take his picture, since soon, even without a pardon,

when he leaves prison to go back to this "rusty pen" with those equally rusty ideas and slogans about "Kosovo a republic," both Adem Demaqi and all those who think like him, as things now stand, can go straight to the photographer's.

### **Prlja on Foreigners' Ignorance of Serbia**

90EB0327A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 25 Feb 90  
pp 10-12

[Interview with Dr. Aleksandar Prlja, Serbian Republic secretary for foreign affairs, by Teodor Andjelic; place and date not given]

[Text] Dr. Aleksandar Prlja, member of the Serbian Government, republic secretary for foreign affairs, has just come back from an official trip to the United States, Sweden, and Switzerland. One of the reasons he went was so that finally, at least here in Yugoslavia, we would understand why Albanian propaganda has so much influence in the world and, still "more fascinating," how Albanian propaganda is induced by "our own," domestic, "northwestern" propaganda.

For a professional journalist who began his career right here with NIN, for a man who was for many years a foreign correspondent and columnist for POLITIKA, for the founder of the Yugoslav Cultural Center in Paris, this trip, as we will see at once, was something more than valuable. Both in the number of conversations he had and because of a number of interviews published, and because of the bitter knowledge he gained about the great truth, which is extremely neglected to say the least, about Serbia and Yugoslavia.

[NIN] What is your main impression gained during the trip?

[Prlja] My main impression is that Serbia is misrepresented in the world. We are trailing behind all the rest in Yugoslavia!

There is no one so misrepresented as Serbia and its policy toward Kosovo, its policy toward the economy and democracy. I have never seen such a flagrant discrepancy between reality and the negative picture that has been created all over the world. I have had occasion to visit Biafra, or Algeria, or the Near East, Afghanistan, or Poland, when the situation was still unclear. Never was there such a difference between what I knew from before and what was actually happening in that country, even though those countries were set upon by perplexities, by events which caused confusion. Never! I would say that Serbia is a unique case in modern European history, perhaps even more broadly than Europe!

I did not come here to criticize such prestigious people as those who run a paper like, say, THE NEW YORK TIMES, one of the two world-class newspapers which I respect the most and have read all my life, but there is much that even they do not know. For example, the

foreign political editor of THE NEW YORK TIMES did not know that Kosovo had never belonged to Albania!

[NIN] How strong, in your judgment, is the Albanian lobby in America?

[Prlja] The Albanian lobby is strong. Smuggling routes cross in America, the money goes there, they are well organized, they are loud, they are quick to organize demonstrations, which they do much more frequently and readily than all the rest who have connections with Yugoslavia, and they have also begun to write petitions to congressmen, senators, and governors. They are very much in evidence and quite recently they have even hired individuals and agencies to lobby for them.

People like Tom Lantos, for example, a respected congressman who is chairman of a large group for political rights in the Congress, was also unaware that Kosovo had never been a part of Albania. And he has been to Yugoslavia! Who has been briefing him, who from Yugoslavia has been telling him about Kosovo—I don't know! He is not aware of what rights Albanians actually have in Kosovo. At a large luncheon at the Cosmos Club in Washington—Janez Stanovnik was there the year before last—he simply could not believe it when I told him that back in 1985 the vice president of our state was an Albanian from Kosovo, but he was not included in the book of statesmen.

They have a hard time understanding this even when they are told that the only university in the world with instruction in the language of an ethnic minority is Pristina University (there was never one in the Tyrol, nor in the Basque country, nor in Ireland, nowhere and never; nor were we even bound to do this by the Helsinki Accords). This is all utterly unknown, and unfortunately, since we are decades behind, this does not seem convincing and persuasive to them.

[NIN] Where are the most frequent sources of untruths about us? In Yugoslavia?

[Prlja] No doubt about it whatsoever! You can call those sources the anti-Serb coalition or whatever you like, but the malice which is always on watch to see that the truth does not get through about Serbia's actual policy, about the actual attitude toward Kosovo, and about the actual truth that exists, comes from our own country!

For example: I was returning from New York, where I even "defended" the Markovic government as our federal government, saying that in our opinion Serbia has been given an unfair part of the burden in the reform, but that this still was not something that was turning us toward obstructive opposition, especially if this is a way for us to make some headway toward a market economy and to open up from the standpoint of the market and the economy in a unified Yugoslavia. I said all that, and then the airplane from New York lands in Zagreb, and I pick up VJESNIK and read about "their agile minister of foreign affairs, Dr Aleksandar Prlja, who has been squatting in the State Department for days now...." What do

the American Consulate in Zagreb and the Cultural Center think about all this? Is that the way you encourage reconciliation in Yugoslavia, or at least a sense of dignity before a third party, or is this the way of distorting the picture even of Yugoslavia as much as possible, Yugoslavia which is still our common homeland and our common state?!

Those are things, of course, which are really difficult for a foreigner to understand—that someone from your own country, whose language is your language, should speak like that. A foreigner cannot imagine that kind of behavior from the same state, from a nationality that is in principle fraternal, from a national of the same country. He has never seen anything like it. Not even in Belgium, where the Flemish and Walloons are much further from one another as nationalities, has he seen such examples, although their conflicts—conflicts of interest—are often more serious and result in divisions.

This is an immense historical responsibility; we have to call it by its right name. This is a responsibility which is resulting in an inappropriate policy in certain phases of the largest countries, and to a large extent, whether this is conscious or not—it is hard for me to think that it is altogether unconscious—it is not contributing to the unity of Yugoslavia, but tends in various ways toward breaking it up.

[NIN] What view is held in the world about Yugoslavia's unity and integrity?

[Prlja] You have seen that America is constantly issuing statements about firm support of Yugoslavia's integrity, sovereignty, and unity. That has been the case since the war. However, I do remember that in 1970 Nixon ended his speech in Kumrovec by exclaiming: Long Live Free Croatia! When de Gaulle shouted: Long Live Free Quebec, during his visit to Canada, this caused an uproar, and he had to cut his visit short.

[NIN] This past weekend I happened to read Miko Tripalo's book "Hrvatsko proljeće" [Croatian Spring]. He also had occasion to quote Nixon!

[Prlja] Those are things etched into one's memory! While I was in America, the newsmen asked the official State Department spokesman whether he thought that a unified Yugoslavia was obligatory for the security of Europe? Perhaps it would be better if it were divided? It is true that the answer to that question was extemporaneous, but it was not the conventional one and was different from what it had been only three weeks before. The State Department spokeswoman said: That is a strange question, very hypothetical. You know that we have recognized Yugoslavia and that we have an ambassador there. I do not intend to follow you down that very hypothetical road, sir.

Dzevad Mujazinovic, our ambassador in Washington, sent a man to the State Department on this account, and the people in the State Department explained to him that the spokeswoman had been caught off guard and that

they would perhaps issue a correction the very next week, but they did not. However, three days later there was an editorial in THE NEW YORK TIMES (I do not know if it was reprinted here) which said: One Yugoslavia or more than one? America, the editorial said, is interested in three things as far as Yugoslavia is concerned: reforms, liberalization, and unity, in that order. That's really something! There has never been anything like this, I must say. It is quite certain that this is not coming from Serbia!

There is something else I must tell you, once again to be honest. There is right now a man in the Soviet Embassy, I have been informed officially, a counselor who represents only the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and who is looking above all to relations with Serbia and Montenegro.

I must say that there have been hints on several occasions that perhaps Serbian and Russian consuls might be exchanged. We in Serbia, aside from all the affinities we have and the great importance which we as Serbia attribute to cooperation with the RSFSR, both today and yesterday and permanently, let it be known, nevertheless cannot take that step. As though there were no Yugoslavia?

[NIN] How did you react to the statements by the Austrian minister in Ljubljana?

[Prlja] I would not like to consider Mr. Busek an expression of official Austrian policy. I must, however, make the observation that statements like that are not being made on the soil of Serbia, since if that were the case, we would remind our guests of Yugoslavia. We consider ourselves obligated to do that, although we can understand and we also have a desire for separate complementary relations of Serbia within our system, say, with Israel, or with the RSFSR, or with Bavaria....

President Milosevic was surprised when he was recently asked why he had refused to receive Mrs. Kathryn Graham, owner of the WASHINGTON POST and NEWSWEEK. Her request for a conversation never reached him. There have been a host of such examples even with foreign ambassadors and their being received in Serbia. Those requests do not go directly, but by protocol through federal channels, and it seems that that is where they often are being given negative, but inaccurate responses "in advance." I am not making an accusation, I am just presenting specific examples. This is bad and this is improper, it tends to cause misunderstanding even on the part of friends, much less those who are not so well-intentioned. The supposed refusals in Serbia give the impression that it is shying away from something and is concealing something. Serbia has no need for that, the case is quite the reverse.

[NIN] How is it that important figures you spoke with abroad are not informed about elementary truths?

[Prlja] For a long time, we had an inappropriate practice in presenting the truth about Serbia, about its culture,

tradition, and roots; about Serbia's democratic past, about Kosovo. This was the period of postwar history in which the words Serbia and Serbs were not mentioned at all. For years, we often sent to the diplomatic service from Serbia people who did not have the appropriate attributes, to put it mildly. Even toward our emigres in various parts of the world they behaved as they would toward political opponents, with the most severe ideological prejudices, and they aroused only hostility. We sent that Comintern mentality abroad. Not only did they do poorly in defending Serbia, they were also harmful to the prestige of Yugoslavia. But we here have not been the source of slander about the other republics, and that kind of defense against us has not been necessary.

[NIN] Why should it bother anyone at this point that Serbia should want to reestablish normal international communications which the other republics, incidentally, have had for decades now?

[Prlja] When you go to Brussels, Strasbourg, Munich, or Washington, you see the representatives from our other republics, especially from Slovenia, maintain permanent and close contacts. We have never been there, and our colleagues from Yugoslavia are only now becoming accustomed to the new situation. The custom was in Europe for only two of our republics to be represented, those which have ties with the "Alps-Adriatic" group. But this time in Davos, for example, Serbia was there in addition to Croatia and Slovenia.

[NIN] How is it possible that the people in our Secretariat for Foreign Affairs should still not have gotten their bearings concerning everything that has been happening in Kosovo? How is it possible that in the Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs in particular they should not recall the previous personnel and other scandals? The Yugoslav Consul in Vancouver, an Albanian, requested political asylum of Canada, representing himself directly as an officer in the Albanian intelligence service. He had fled to Albania earlier, a prohibition prevented him from being a teacher, but he nevertheless became a consul....

[Prlja] I must tell you that the earlier government administrations in Serbia bear part of the responsibility for such scandals. We cannot simply accuse the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs. Serbia was in a special position. It was constantly apologizing for the times before the war and various other times, and it was never in a situation to present itself to the world. It is doing that only now. But whenever you have to halt a practice, this puts you in an uncomfortable position. It appears that you are taking away someone's vested rights. Can it be taken as a vested right that emigres should come from Albania without limitation and for the authorities in Belgrade to know nothing about this? That is a one-way street. There has never been such a case in history. And when you put a stop to that, then you are seen as having disrupted something which someone interpreted as his right. That is what is going on.

[NIN] How do you explain that we received emigres from Albania, but sent back emigres from Romania who by nationality were Serbs and Croats?

[Prlja] The Serbian minorities, you see, were over a lengthy period a forgotten and taboo topic. All these situations are based on that fact. For example, in Hungary today the Serbs have all their rights, but today there are only 5,000 or 6,000 of them. What is left are the houses of that minority and traces of their culture and everyday life; what are left are the buildings, the cultural monuments, we can see from what is left where they were. It is like when you go to some land of extinct peoples, somewhere in the Andes, like the civilization of the Incas.

The number of Serbs has also been essentially reduced in Romania. Many moved away, many of them were killed and died off in various godforsaken places. Who is to blame for all that? We had a situation at one time when our official representative wrote back to us from there: "In the end, we have to forgive, that suffering of our people occurred during the Cominform and Stalinist period." Thus, he said, we forgave even that Romanian Government which sent Stukas against us from its airfields.

[NIN] Would you like at this point to state in more specific terms some of the issues concerning the position of Serbs in Romania?

[Prlja] This very day I told the Romanian ambassador, who was making an official visit to the Council: Please, give some new school in Romania to the Serbs, not just to the Hungarians and Germans. Fine, perhaps there are more of them. But also make a gesture toward the Serbs. I said that we are their friends, that we are happy that that border will be opened, that we will have the Danube, and that we will be a part of Europe in the near future, a Europe which is much better than certain others, if you ask me. But as for sending those unfortunate people back, that is a horrifying shame.

[NIN] Might there ever be a time again, as there was a few years ago, when the small Danube opstinas in Yugoslavia, Golubac, Gradiste, and others, had an item in their opstina budgets: "Funds to bury Romanians who were killed"?

[Prlja] I think that that time will never come back on the Danube. That was a double shame of our countries, the greatest in the history of our relations. Neither the Serbian nor Romanian people have ever killed anyone because they moved or changed their place of residence. That was not part of their mentality.

[NIN] How important to Serbia are the changes in Bulgaria?

[Prlja] At this point, it is rather difficult to figure who is shrinking more from whom. The Macedonians, of course, are shrinking from everything that disputed their national integrity. Yugoslavia, of course, understands

that. Serbia as well. On the whole, we are trying to nurture good relations. With Greece, for example, Serbia does not have a direct border contact. Macedonia stands between us. But we are traditional friends, and we are no longer afraid of the words "traditional friendship," although some people even in the Yugoslav Assembly have recently made objection to that phrasing of ours. We do have authentic ties with the Greek people based on traditional friendship. I do not believe that denial of that fact would be of any benefit to Macedonia or anyone else. The Greeks preserve our cultural and historical monuments with great piety. We intend now to build a museum on the island of Vid where there is a memorial cemetery to the Serbian soldiers in World War I, and we will also organize air transportation to the island of Corfu, so that our schoolchildren and citizens can visit that important place in Serbian history.

[NIN] In Davos, you recently had occasion to report on the real situation in Serbia. What did you say about the reforms and about democracy here?

[Prlja] That was a most eminent world meeting in Davos. I went to the speaker's stand and said: I am from Serbia. This is the largest republic in Yugoslavia, it is an old state, older than Yugoslavia, but it is a sincere part of federal Yugoslavia. I would like to tell you that this is a country which is completely ready and open to make the transition to an economic system based on diverse forms of ownership. If you do not believe me, come and see for yourself, you can invest in all branches of the economy. And second, I said, that our multiparty future has begun and is not pluralistic, but multiparty.

In the evening, after my speech in Davos, a high-level Swiss official, Mr. Lasha, who has been Swiss prime minister, asked me: Is everything you said about Serbia this morning true? Absolutely everything? Completely true, I answered. Every word. The prime minister raised his eyebrows: I must tell you that many people whom I meet officially from your country have been creating a completely different picture of Serbia.

Need I say that I was not surprised by that?!

#### **'Anti-Yugoslav' Activities of Albanian Emigre Groups Described**

*90EB0317A Belgrade NARODNA ARMIJA in Serbo-Croatian 1 Feb 90 pp 54-58*

[Article by P. Knezevic and M. Boskovic: "The Dream of a 'Greater Albania'"]

[Text] Anti-Yugoslav emigres, in an alliance with internal enemies and reactionary forces abroad and foreign intelligence services, is constantly acting against the SFRY. The anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres of Yugoslav origin are particularly active. During the last 10 years, their extremist wing has been involved in well-planned and well-organized propaganda, and intelligence and terrorist activities. Their destructive activity, especially their psychological propaganda and terrorist

activity, grew after the events in Kosovo in 1981. Their psychological propaganda activity has particularly increased since 1988. In just the first 10 months of that year, more anti-Yugoslav actions were carried out than in several preceding years.

### Political Platform

Until the 1980's, the activity of the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres was uncoordinated and suffered from rivalry and factional struggles. For a long time, the right-wing groups and organizations, especially the Ballist and Zogist-monarchist ones, did not have "Kosovo a republic" as a common goal in their programs. Nevertheless, their ties with Albanian nationalists and separatists in Kosovo and the illegal groups and organizations uncovered in Kosovo, western Macedonia, and parts of Montenegro confirm that with the assistance of the Albanian intelligence service, Sigurimi, the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres have recently, and especially in 1988, been uniting on an ethnic basis and reconciling their positions on the methods of fighting to realize the idea of "Kosovo a republic" and its final goal—the unification of Kosovo with Albania, and the creation of a "Greater Albania." The best known extremist organizations of the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres, the National Movement for a Republic of Kosovo and Red National Front, reached an agreement on joint action with the Croatian anti-Yugoslav organization. Their purpose is identical—the destruction of Yugoslavia. The basis of the political platform of the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres is the Albanian Labor Party's program based on Enver Hoxha's book "The Titoists," anti-Yugoslavism, and Greater-Albanian claims to parts of Yugoslavia.

The anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres are trying to create the impression among the world public that not only the emigres, but also all Albanians in Yugoslavia and working temporarily abroad are against the sociopolitical system of the SFRY and in favor of the fulfillment of the idea of "Kosovo a republic." Systematically and persistently spreading lies about the alleged jeopardy to Albanians in Yugoslavia, they are trying to internationalize the Kosovo problem through the "struggle for human rights." They are also announcing the formation of militant groups, which could lead to anti-Yugoslav violence abroad, like the attack against our consulate in Australia at the end of 1988, and to terrorist actions in Yugoslavia. Using pressure and blackmail, together with anti-Yugoslav Croatian emigres, they are trying to win over our ethnic Albanian workers abroad to their anti-Yugoslav coalition. They do not care about our workers' ideological orientation, but only about whether they support the destruction of Yugoslavia and the annexation of Kosovo to Albania. At the same time, the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres are creating an alliance with Mafia groups and Islamic fundamentalist extremist terrorist organizations.

The anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres are divided into two factions: a monarchist-Ballist faction, which operates on

the basis of "right-wing" positions, and a so-called Marxist-Leninist or nationalist-separatist one under the influence of Albania, which operates on the basis of "left-wing" positions. The former operates mainly due to support from the intelligence services of certain Western countries, and directs the brunt of its activity against the SFRY and the Yugoslav National Army [JNA], and to a lesser extent against Albania. The latter is adaptable, and serves Albania's current policy toward Yugoslavia. Recently the "right" and "left" have united in their hostile activity against Yugoslavia.

The monarchist-Ballist faction includes groups and associations of postwar emigre Albanians of Yugoslav origin, whose ideological platform is close to the defeated bourgeois and quisling forces. The best known are the Prizren League, Bali Kombetar, Legalitet, the League of Kosovars, and the Albanian Democratic League, ONDS.

### Prizren League

The "Prizren League in Exile," or the so-called Third Prizren League, was founded on 20 October 1961 in New York, at the initiative of the American intelligence service, by the well-known fascist and founder of the Second Prizren League, Dzafer Deva, and his colleagues, Ismet Berisa, Ismet Uk Sadiku, Hamdi Koljosi, Mithata Vranica, and others. The intention of the leaders was to unite Albanian emigres with the platform of the First Prizren League, but this time in a struggle against Yugoslavia.

After the death of Dzafer Deva, Ismet Berisa became the head of the Prizren League in Exile. In 1966 the organization adopted a new program and statute. A Main Council and Advisory Council were formed, the first as an executive body, and the second as an assembly. In addition to this, national committees were founded for Canada, the United States, Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Austria, and Turkey. At the Congress in New York in 1966, it was decided that most of the organization's activities would be shifted to Europe in order to unite and organize emigres, and to undertake direct action in Kosovo. The organization's basic task is to "struggle by all means available against communism in Yugoslavia and to annex Kosovo to Albania."

The organization is involved in propaganda and intelligence work. In addition to the newspaper PRIZRENSKI SAVEZ, it prints propaganda material and ships it to Yugoslavia. The Prizren League's leadership has had ties with the anti-Yugoslav Croatian emigres for a long time. The organization maintains ties with foreign intelligence services, especially the Albanian service.

### Bali Kombetar

Bali Kombetar (National Front), the oldest organization of the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres, was founded in 1939 as a movement fighting against the Italian occupiers. Later, with the infiltration of agents of the occupiers, it turned into a quisling organization. At the end of 1945 it changed its name to the Democratic Agrarian



Party, and joined in the struggle against Yugoslavia and Albania. It was joined by the Ballists—members of quisling units that fought on the side of the occupiers against the national liberation movement in Kosovo and Albania.

The purpose of the organization is the creation of a "Greater Albania," which would be a "bourgeois republic." Its headquarters is in Rome, but it also acts against Yugoslavia from Turkey, France, West Germany, Belgium, Sweden, Great Britain, Canada, and the United States. It publishes the newspaper BESA.

In 1950 Bali Kombetar broke apart into two wings—the extremist Bali Agrar (Agrarian Front), headed by Abaz Ermeni, and the moderate United Bali Kombetar, under the leadership of Alja Keljira. The extremist wing has about 1,500 members, and its executive body is the National Democratic Committee for a Free Albania, which made that faction a member of the Community of Enslaved Peoples of Europe (ACEN). It is involved in psychological-propaganda action, and also advocates terrorism. The headquarters of its branches are in Chicago and New York. The League of Kosovars also operates as part of it. Some of the members of the moderate wing have joined the more extreme Bali Agrar, but until recently most of the members either were not active or joined the monarchist-Zogist organization Legalitet.

#### Legalitet

Legalitet ("Legality" or "Dynastic Inheritance"), a monarchist organization of anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres of Albanian and Yugoslav origin, unites the supporters of former Albanian King Ahmet Zogu. It was founded in 1949. It has about 1,500 members, and seeks to reestablish the monarchy within the borders of "ethnic Albania." The ideological leader of the organization is Zogu's son, Leka Zogu I, the self-styled King of Albania.

After the separatist events in Kosovo in 1981, Legalitet also tried to prove that it was a determined fighter for the "rights of Albanians in the SFRY." That is why the movement expanded its program and political platform, emphasizing that "it was not fighting for the reestablishment of the monarchy only on the territory of the present People's Socialist Republic of Albania, but also for the annexation of parts of the territory of the SFRY, where the Albanian people live, to a Greater Ethnic Albania." Legalitet conducts propaganda, intelligence, and terrorist actions against the SFRY. It has branches in the United States, Australia, Canada, Belgium, France, Great Britain, Sweden, and West Germany. It publishes the newspaper ALDHEU (Homeland).

#### League of Kosovars

The League of Kosovars, one of the oldest anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigre organizations, was founded in Rome in 1946 by Dzafer Deva. Its goal was to admit and provide assistance to ethnic Albanian emigres and to help them resettle in the West. The organization soon fell apart into several factions. There are still individuals, however,

who are devoted to the ideas of "solidarity" that the League of Kosovars advocated. Today they are mostly smaller groups, mostly consisting of secondary school and university students of Kosovo origin, who are active in the Western countries. The League of Kosovars has been a member of the so-called Community of the Enslaved Peoples of Europe since the latter's founding. It persistently strives to indoctrinate its members for the struggle against Yugoslavia, and to create strongholds within Yugoslavia, the LCY [League of Communists of Yugoslavia], the JNA, the Internal Affairs Secretariat [SUP], and the schools.

The Albanian National Democratic League (ONDS) was founded at the end of 1976 in Brussels, with the intention of creating a united front of Kosovo Albanians in Europe. Its head is Emin Fazlija, and it is active in West Germany, Belgium, and Sweden. It advocates the creation of a "Republic of Kosovo" and the annexation of Kosovo to Albania. It cooperates closely with Albanian nationalists and separatists in Kosovo. In addition to propaganda based on Albanian nationalism and separatism, it has recently also been advocating sabotage and terrorist actions against our diplomatic and consular representations. The organization has developed cooperation with Ustasa terrorist groups in West Germany, and with certain reactionary circles in the West.

The Free Kosovo National Committee (Kosovo e Lire) was founded in Canada in 1965 by Midhat Vranica. It advocates the creation of a "separate republic" as a state for the Albanians living in Yugoslavia. That, however, is only the "first step" toward the final unification and creation of a "Greater Albania." According to the organization's plans, the future state, the republic of "Ethnic Kosovo," would also include, in addition to Kosovo, parts of Montenegro (Bar, Ulcinj, Titograd, Ivograd), several Serbian cities (Sjenica, Novi Pazar, Vranje, and Raska), and several Macedonian cities (Titov Veles, Ohrid, Skopje, and Prespa).

The Free Kosovo National Committee and the Prizren League in Exile reached an agreement in 1978, the so-called Kosovo vow on a joint struggle against Yugoslavia. They publish the newspapers LIDHJA E PRIZRENIT (The Prizren League) and DARDANIA, and various pamphlets in which they make crude attacks against our country. In connection with the events in Kosovo they have sent, and are still sending, memorandums, petitions, and letters to various officials of the United States, Western statesmen, the UN Secretary General, etc., in which they attack Yugoslavia for "gross violations of the human rights of Albanians living in Yugoslavia." They are supported in this by the Albanian lobby in the United States, headed by former Congressman Joseph Dioguardi, an Albanian of Italian origin.

The Marxist-Leninist and nationalist-separatist faction consists of the Red National Front, the Movement for an Albanian Socialist Republic In Yugoslavia, the National



Movement for a Republic of Kosovo, the Marxist-Leninists of Kosovo, Free Youth in a Free World, and others.

#### Red National Front

Ibrahim Keljmemdi formed the Red National Front when he left Yugoslavia to "study" in West Germany in 1977. In September 1979 in Stuttgart, two ethnic Albanian workers from Kosovo founded the group Zeri Kosoves (Voice of Kosovo). The Red Front, which was founded somewhat earlier, and the Voice of Kosovo soon included about 300 sympathizers. Its members wrote more than 200 pamphlets and other anti-Yugoslav propaganda material, which was distributed among our workers abroad, and some of the material was illegally smuggled into Yugoslavia. They drafted a "Program," "Rules of Operation," a "Membership Application Questionnaire," and a "Register of Sympathizers." In 1980 these two groups joined together with the groups of the Red National Front into a united organization that is active in West Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, Austria, Sweden, and several other West European countries, as well as the United States and Australia.

Threats, blackmail, and beating our citizens and even journalists are only some of the destructive actions by Red National Front extremists. Since March 1981, they have set fire to clubs of our workers and official representatives in Belgium 11 times; they have broken into the SFRY embassy building in Brussels and wounded two of its employees; they made an attack against an official of our embassy at the Yugoslavia Club in Brussels; and they have killed five of our employees and wounded six.

The Red National Front is not a classic emigre organization, because its ranks also include our workers in West European countries. The core of the Red National Front consists of 30 extreme Albanian nationalists and separatists.

After the nationalist events in Kosovo in 1981, the Red National Front provided comprehensive support to the nationalist and separatist forces in Kosovo, and used an anti-Yugoslav platform to gather our citizens working in Western Europe and the United States.

The crisis of the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres in West Germany and Switzerland caused by the deaths of the brothers Grval and Zeka Kadri, Red National Front leaders, in an emigre clash in January 1982, was surmounted by the transformation of the Red National Front into the Movement for an Albanian Socialist Republic in Yugoslavia [PASRJ], in May 1982.

#### PASRJ

The creation of the "movement" as a united front of Albanian nationalists and separatists abroad was initiated and supported by Albania. The leaders of the illegal organizations discovered in Kosovo—the Movement for the National Liberation of Kosovo, the Communist

Marxist-Leninist Party of Albanians in Yugoslavia, the Group of Kosovo Marxist-Leninists, the Red Popular Front, etc.—fled to join the leadership of the Movement. The PASRJ succeeded in establishing itself as the leading force within the ranks of the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres, with its base among the separatists in Kosovo. The PASRJ's program documents are based on the ideological-political platform of the Albanian Labor Party. Its goal is a "Republic of Kosovo." The organization has outposts in Vienna, Zurich, Geneva, Stuttgart, Brussels, Malme, Paris, and the United States.

The PASRJ propaganda headquarters and presses in Switzerland, West Germany, Sweden, and the United States print the emigre magazines ZERI I KOSOVES and PUNETORI, flyers, pamphlets, books, stickers, and other propaganda material with an anti-Yugoslav content, which are distributed abroad and smuggled into Yugoslavia.

The PASRJ's leadership core has ties with some of the separatists in Kosovo. PASRJ activists participate in the activities of Albanian nationalists and separatists within Yugoslavia. They create new channels and contacts, and print propaganda material which they try to smuggle into Yugoslavia, relying on ethnic Albanian workers recruited for the purposes of the movement. They collect money and assist the families of convicted nationalists. They gather weapons for groups and individuals who, at a suitable moment, could be infiltrated into Yugoslavia to join the "rebels" in Kosovo. They encourage nationalists in Yugoslavia to continue their hostile actions, and to go to extremes in carrying out their plans. The PASRJ is trying to shift its activity to those areas of Yugoslavia where it has contacts among the Albanians who work and study there.

Since 1986, the organization called the Marxist-Leninists of Kosovo [MLK] has also been active in Switzerland. It is headed by the former leader of the illegal Kosovo organization of the same name.

#### Methods of Action

The methods of action of the illegal organizations and groups of the MLK and PASRJ are continuous ideological indoctrination in "Marxist-Leninist principles and the unity of the national and class struggle," and in the program of the Albanian Labor Party; creation of organizational forms for illegal activity intended to cover all areas inhabited by the Albanian population in Yugoslavia; the development of a mass membership by penetrating the ranks of secondary school and university student youth organizations and other groups; close ties between the leading activists of the illegal organizations in Yugoslavia and the leaders of the PASRJ and other similar emigre organizations; ties between the members of illegal organizations and Sigurimi, the Albanian Labor Party, and Albania's diplomatic and consular representations in Western Europe.

The anti-Yugoslav activity of the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres is demonstrated, among other things, by

the illegal groups that have been discovered in Kosovo, which belonged to the PASRJ and MLK organizations.

The MLK is a characteristic example of the organization of illegal groups. That illegal organization had branch "district" or "local" committees in Klina, Kacanik, and Lipljan, a "subcommittee for southern Kosovo" and the "Albanian regions in Macedonia" in Pristina, and lower forms of organization, "cells" and "groups" in Bujanovac and Bar. The PASRJ and MLK also had branches and members throughout the entire SFRY. The leaders of the "cell" branches had ties with the Albanian intelligence service and the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres, and have been directed to work independently to build a mass membership.

In an attempt to mask the influence of Albania over the activity of Albanian separatists, a National Movement for a Republic of Kosovo (NPRK) was formed in Switzerland in 1986. It is issuing an ultimatum for partnership and dialogue with the LCY on the creation of an "Albanian Socialist Republic of Kosovo," as part of Yugoslavia, with a right to self-determination. The movement intends to achieve that goal by conducting a long-term struggle, in three phases: ideological preparation, indoctrination, and mass organization; the organization of political propaganda actions abroad and in Yugoslavia; and an armed "uprising" in Kosovo.

The Albanian Youth of Kosovo in a Free World was founded in 1977 in the United States, with the goal of gathering ethnic Albanian youths of Yugoslav origin; it was not successful in this. The organization consists of a small group headed by Maliga Arifi. It has been active on the basis of anti-Yugoslav positions since it was founded. It has participated in the organization of all anti-Yugoslav demonstrations in New York, and in the distribution of pamphlets and other material with an anti-Yugoslav content. Recently it has been sending memorandums, petitions, and letters to foreign statesmen and organizations, in which it requests "protection for the human rights of Albanians in the SFRY."

#### **Committees for the Protection of the Human Rights of Albanians**

Also active against Yugoslavia in the West are the newly formed groups of "committees for the protection of the human rights of Albanians in the SFRY." They are under the influence of the leftist organizations of the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres, and try to portray themselves as humanitarian organizations in the struggle for "human rights." Their basic activity is propaganda about the alleged "threat to the human rights of Albanians in the SFRY." Their goal is to internationalize the problem of Kosovo by mobilizing the political structures of Western countries, various international organizations, state institutions, public opinion, and the news media. The best known ones are the Committee for the Defense of the Rights of Albanians, founded in Brussels in 1981, the Kosovo Committee in Bern, and the Committee for Kosovo in West Germany.

Recently, the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres have been directing their anti-Yugoslav activity primarily toward ethnic Albanians of Yugoslav origin, who are working in the countries of Western Europe.

The goal of the propaganda activity of the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres is to "arouse national awareness," incite and encourage separatism, and conduct ideological indoctrination. Through Albanian emigre and nationalist-separatist organizations, and various "friendship societies," the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres are working on recruiting our citizens abroad for anti-Yugoslav activity.

That is particularly evident in Switzerland, West Germany (especially in the areas of Stuttgart, Frankfurt, Dusseldorf, and Hamburg), Sweden, and Belgium, and recently in Norway and Denmark as well.

The anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres are particularly trying to intensify their influence among our seasonal workers of Albanian nationality in Switzerland. They are intensively active in the March-December period, when there are the most Yugoslav seasonal workers there. Thus, the nationalist club Azem Voksi, whose headquarters is in Lausanne, organizes monthly meetings in various places. At these meetings, reports are submitted on the Prizren League, the "justification" of the slogan "a Kosovo republic." Dramas and recitals are performed, and propaganda material demanding a "greater pure Albania" is distributed. The better known ethnic clubs in West Germany are Emir Duraku, Isa Boljetini, Ibe Palikuca, and Sari; in Switzerland, Sote Galica, Azem Voksi, Hasan Pristina, and Lirija; in New York, Jusuf Grvala; and in Malmo, Kosovo.

#### **Propaganda Activity**

In the places where there are the most Yugoslav citizens of Albanian nationality, the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres have organized ethnic clubs and housing centers, and are also organizing gatherings at firms. In their attempt to take over the clubs loyal to Yugoslavia and to turn them into nationalist-separatist ones, they are even resorting to violent methods. They threaten the most active club members and the Albanians loyal to Yugoslavia and their families, and condemn them as "traitors to the Albanian people." They inform them that they have been "sentenced" to death. The anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres also use pressure and crude threats to extort money, allegedly for club memberships. In fact, this money is used to print propaganda material, organize demonstrations, aid the families of those who have been killed or arrested in nationalist-separatist demonstrations in Kosovo, and buy weapons. The PASRJ has influence in about 20 clubs.

The anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres conduct psychological propaganda, intelligence-subversive, and sabotage-terrorist activities. The first two types have been most prominent in their activities to date. Recently terrorism has become more and more frequent.

Their psychological propaganda activity is conducted by printing and distributing emigre newspapers, pamphlets, and flyers, which are dominated by articles about the alleged genocide against the Albanian population in Yugoslavia, and the "plundering of Kosovo." They also publish announcements calling upon Albanians to fight to achieve "their legitimate demands and to create a republic of Kosovo and ethnic Albania." They interpret significant events in our country in a hostile and malicious manner, glorify the system and leadership of Albania, and praise Enver Hoxha.

The anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres publish nine regular and six aperiodic newspapers, magazines, and bulletins, which are printed in New York, Detroit, Stuttgart, Zurich, Brussels, Melbourne, and other centers. The ones regularly published are the Albanian Resistance organ FLUMURI (Flag) in New York, the Legalitet organ ALDHEU (Homeland), also in New York, the organ of the Free Homeland Committee, SHQIPTARI LIRE (Free Albanians), and the organ of the Combat Front, GLAS KOSOVARA.

In addition to its own publications, the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres also use propaganda material from Albania that makes crude attacks against the SFRY and supports the nationalists in Kosovo.

#### Internationalization of the "Albanian Question"

New emigre newspapers and magazines are also being prepared. In addition to this, the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres have purchased time for a large number of radio and television programs in Western Europe and especially in the United States, which they use intensively in their anti-Yugoslav campaign. They coordinate their propaganda with the principles and positions of Western democracy, and everything that can be included in the concept of "protection of human rights." In that way, they have succeeded in winning the support of international organizations known for their anticommunist orientation, for example, the "anticommunist bloc of nations" [as published].

Special forms of anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigre propaganda are anti-Yugoslav demonstrations abroad, which were more numerous in Western Europe and overseas than in 1988, especially in the last few months.

At all of the demonstrations, they openly expressed nationalist-separatist positions on Kosovo, and supported Albania's policy on Kosovo.

During 1987, the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres organized 21 anti-Yugoslav demonstrations, with about 3,663 participants. Of these seven were in the United States, with 800 participants, three in West Germany, with 700, six in Sweden, with 175, and one each in Sweden, with 250, Australia, with 130, and Norway, with 150 demonstrators. By the end of 1988, they organized 24 anti-Yugoslav demonstrations, with more than 5,600 participants, i.e., about 2,000 more than in 1987.

The anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres' psychological propaganda activity, including anti-Yugoslav demonstrations, is aimed at attempting to internationalize the "Albanian question" in Kosovo and encouraging foreign elements to interfere in Yugoslav internal affairs. For that purpose, the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres and Albania, with the support of the Albanian lobby in the United States, are sending memorandums and written material to the UN, the European Parliament, the CSCE, and governments and prominent figures in Western Europe and the United States. The memorandums contain false accusations of "discrimination, assimilation, torture, and genocide against Albanians" in Kosovo and other parts of Yugoslavia. They present "facts" about the number of Albanians arrested and convicted in the SFRY, particularly young people, who are put in the context of "historical injustices and the failure to solve the problem of Kosovo's economic underdevelopment." They demand that the UN mediate with the Yugoslav government "to stop the persecution of Albanians." They propose that the UN form ad hoc groups and investigative bodies to examine and determine the state of affairs in Kosovo, etc.

#### Third Phase an "Armed Uprising"

The anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres are trying to gain the support of some of the internationally recognized nongovernmental organizations for their goals, and have partly succeeded in this. Recently Amnesty International has shown increased interest in "prisoners of conscience" and individuals in "isolation" in Kosovo, and the position of the Albanian nationality in Yugoslavia.

Also evident is the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres' attempt to influence some members of the American Congress and other legislative bodies in order to gain their support for their goals. It has succeeded in getting a group of congressmen and senators, Crane, Dioguardi, Broomfield, Simon, Dole, and Riegel, to become active in the struggle for the "rights of Albanians in the SFRY."

Some of the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres have recently estimated that it will be difficult to achieve their final goals by "persuading the SFRY." They therefore advocate shifting to the so-called third phase—an "armed uprising" and the realization of the demand for a "republic of Kosovo," in which terrorist actions would serve as a base for "combat operations." At meetings of the innermost leadership of the PASRJ, plans are voiced for sabotage and terrorist actions, routes for smuggling groups and individuals into Yugoslavia, the use of Albanian territory for anti-Yugoslav actions, lodgings for terrorists outside Kosovo, the training of volunteers, and the acquisition of weapons and sabotage materials. Some of the most radical advocates of terrorism have contacted Ustasa terrorists and Islamic fundamentalists, expressing willingness for fanatical self-sacrifice.

The anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres are increasingly advocating military organization and the training of their members for carrying out "guerrilla operations,"

sabotage, assassinations, arson, arranging accidents, threats and blackmail, beatings, and other typically fascist methods of action.

#### **The PASRJ Has United the Emigres' Activities**

Although more or less all the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigre organizations are committed to carrying out sabotage and terrorist actions, the most militant are the Red National Front, the PASRJ, the NPRK, and the Communist Marxist-Leninist Party of Albanians in Kosovo [KMLPAJ]. In May 1982 they acknowledged the leading role of the PASRJ, which has succeeded in uniting the activities of the Albanian emigres in West Germany, Switzerland, Belgium, Turkey, France, and Sweden. The headquarters of the organization is in Sweden. It is headed by Dzafer Satri, a former political prisoner who escaped from jail. The PASRJ branch in West Germany is headed by Abdulaha Prapastica, who was a member of the illegal organization KMLPAJ until he fled from Yugoslavia to Turkey in 1981.

Within the ranks of the anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigres of Yugoslav and Albanian origin, there are about 10,000 extremists who could carry out so-called guerrilla operations.

In some anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigre groups and organizations there are as many as several hundred extremists, organized in groups of several dozen people assigned for sabotage and terrorist actions, which they would carry out independently or in cooperation with other similar anti-Yugoslav emigre groups, especially the Croatian and Moslem emigres, or with some other international terrorist groups of Islamic origin.

Some terrorist advocate terrorist actions with biological and chemical weapons, because they consider them more effective than the "traditional" ones. The leaders of the Albanian emigre organizations feel that the situation in Yugoslavia is creating favorable conditions for increased work to achieve their "ultimate goal," which is "in the first stage" the creation of an ethnically pure Kosovo and the declaration of a "republic of Kosovo." The anti-Yugoslav Albanian emigre leaders feel that the achievement of this goal would create the initial conditions for the ultimate goal—the creation of a "Greater Albania."

#### **Ethnic Albanians Accused of Drug, Arms Smuggling**

90BA0003A Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 4 Feb 90  
pp 14-15

[Article by Rajko Djurjevic: "Terrorism and the Law-Governed State: Armed Drugs"—first paragraph is NIN introduction]

[Text] The Albanian "drug route" goes from Pec and Prizren in Kosovo-Metohija to Zurich. In the opposite direction, they use the route organized through Ljubljana and Zagreb to transfer weapons. People are dying now at both ends of this road of terrorism.

Zurich, Jan—The Zurich park on Liman Platz, which used to be impressive with its neatness and magnificence, is reminiscent this morning of the "valley of lepers" in Biblical scenes of suffering. Wrapped in rags, 700-800 drug addicts are dying there on spread-out cardboard, under the open sky, and on the frozen ground of the park.

Some Zurich tower is already ringing for the eighth time. A Swiss Red Cross truck stops at the edge of the park. Salvation Army nurses get out. They set up a small folding table and set out metal boxes on it. Their appearance arouses the drug users like a military bugle call. They have a hard time getting up, and without any particular passion, they massage hands and feet stiff with cold. In a coughing crowd, they start moving and head toward the truck. Many of them were lying in their rags as couples, of the same sex or different sexes, but they give the impression that they do not even notice each other.

From the tweezers and gloves of the Salvation Army, the empty eyes and empty hands receive sterile needles for injecting drugs. They take them quietly, return to their bivouacs, and immediately "look for the veins," painfully. Those attempted injections are ghastly.

This morning, no one is moving out from some of the piles of cardboard. Is there anyone still alive there at all? Perhaps they are breathing their last, and do not have the strength to move anymore, or perhaps they simply could not get through one more freezing night. They were killing themselves with drugs, but perished from the cold. The sterilized needles are no longer needed by those who took the "golden hit," the dose that finally killed them, yesterday or perhaps even a few days earlier.

Syringes are being filled throughout the park—the last division and last distribution of the heroin, and the end of the road of terrorism. Where does it start, and how is it brought? The route is long, but convenient and safe. Pec and Prizren in Kosovo are the two main points from which all the heroin sold on the Swiss market comes. That is exclusively a monopoly of the Albanian mafia in Yugoslavia. Pec is held exclusively by them. There are also Turks in the Prizren route, but only at the initial station. There are fewer and fewer of them, and that privilege of unhindered work is ensured for them from abroad on the basis of other considerations. Heroin reaches Kosovo from Istanbul through Bulgaria. It is brought by buses and from Kosovo; it is brought by Turkish women in Turkish trousers. The shipping monopoly in Istanbul, however, is held exclusively by the Albanian mafia living there.

The heroin is brought from Pec and Prizren to Switzerland by the Albanians who live and "work" here. The members of the specific group in question have B or C work visas. Naturally, they do not get up at dawn on winter mornings and go to some job. They are mostly

falsely registered as employed by some of their countrymen who have some firm, and pay taxes and insurance through them, giving the impression of diligent and regularly employed people.

The most important privilege of this group is that the main people in this business have Swiss wives. They actually have their own wives within their circle of family and clans in Kosovo. Their Swiss wives generally stand out for their age, weight, and appearance, but in this "business" those are negligible details.

In the Zurich park, the Salvation Army methodically gathers up the instruments and leaves. It will come again in the morning. Only a little further, a dealer publicly sells heroin as if he were a newsboy offering the morning editions. It is as though drug sales did not interest anyone. The police make a roundup at the park once a week, not to arrest dealers, but to collect the dead.

Here in the maelstrom of Liman, only 200 steps from the Parade Platz, below which the vaults of Zurich give a foreigner the impression that they "step exclusively on levers of gold"—here, before the eyes of the entire world, the youth of Switzerland is dying. They are dying...dying by night and by day, with "golden hits" in horrible suffering and extreme poverty.

The number of drug addicts in Liman Platz is not diminishing. In Zurich alone there are 80,000 registered drug addicts. There are also unregistered ones. On the average, they are minors. Their descent to the lowest level leads them to live in Liman Platz. The special hospital on Windisch, which dominates Zurich, is reserved for drug addicts whose hope of a cure still lies in the support of their parents. The Swiss hospitals are full of drug addicts, and they are on every corner. All in all, Zurich is perhaps the center for young drug users, but it is not the only city of drug addicts in Switzerland.

Except for some hashish that is smuggled by Moroccans from Germany and Belgium, and some cocaine that comes through France, the heroin from the "Albanian connection" constitutes almost 90 percent of the drugs on the Swiss market.

In Pec, a kilogram of "powder" costs 20-30 thousand francs. At the destination, in Switzerland, it is sold wholesale for up to 100,000 francs per kilogram. The dealers sell it for 250-300 francs a gram. One gram is two doses....

It thus turns into hundreds of thousands of francs. Heroin smuggling, however, is only half of the business. When the "goods" are paid for and the incidental expenses are settled, the mafia uses everything that is left over for two purposes: buying property in Kosovo-Metohija or in western Macedonia, and buying weapons for the Kosovo battlefield.

They are supplied with weapons by the Italians and the Czechs, who import them from Germany and Belgium in

large quantities. The price depends on the quality, the caliber, and, naturally, the quantity.

A Beretta costs 300 francs, and a 7.65 mm revolver 400-600. A "long 9 mm" costs 600-800 francs, and a special 36 caliber Magnum is over 800 francs. The Israeli Uzi machine gun costs 1,500-2,000 francs. The Czechs provide Kalashnikovs at somewhat higher prices, but the Uzi dominates the market.

In view of the fact that the Albanian terrorists in Switzerland do not plan to fight in Kosovo-Metohija as their forefathers did, rushing through the forests and hills, but think that they will settle everything through street clashes in villages and cities, they are purchasing exclusively light weapons.

The weapons are not kept in Switzerland. Their Swiss wives, supported by paid relatives or other Swiss, transport them to Yugoslavia. They are smuggled in car trunks or in secret compartments in the floor, or are shipped in trucks to the Ljubljana center. If the main bosses are behind the wheel, it is an open secret that they benefit from the unconcealed sympathy of certain customs officers at our border. The main danger of the route being cut off is from militia spot checks while going through Serbia. Weapons change their route, unlike drugs. The path leads through Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia, and Sandzak to Kosovo.

On New Year's Eve alone, about 100 light weapons were shipped from Arau in the Argau canton to Kosovo-Metohija, more precisely to Pec; and that was in just one package. Weapons are distributed among clans in Kosovo-Metohija. That is an open secret. In recent days and nights Uzis and Kalashnikovs have been heard on the streets of Pec, Suva Reka, Prizren, and Gnjilane...

From the first rebellion in 1981 until now, a large number of young Albanians have been in Switzerland, where they were given asylum. A great deal of attention has been devoted to ideological work with them: they are being prepared for a "return" to Kosovo, and for violence against everything Serbian in Switzerland and in Western Europe in general. The first part of the plan raised the price for Yugoslav passports on the black market to 2,000 Swiss francs, especially those in the name of other nationalities. The violence has also begun. On 19 December in a cafe in Olten, Slobodan Stojanovic and his son, who were celebrating a name day with their guests, were seriously injured out of the blue. That is only a small demonstration of violence. The police came too late. A month earlier in Baden, the same thing happened to Gojko Grubacic, a Serb from Bosnia, and a friend of his.

The Albanian terrorists have maintained Swiss territory as a source of earnings and a place for propaganda for their goals of creating a Greater Albania. They are now convinced that the propaganda war has ended for them. An ethnically pure Kosovo, without the name Metohija, and a population structure of nine Albanians to one Serb are the foundation of their "options."

In order to begin the battle in Yugoslavia, they are preparing for violence against our population abroad. The Serbs, mostly gathered around the Serbian cultural society, are trying to protect themselves. There is no evidence that our consulate in Zurich has responded to all the previous propaganda lies, not to mention other things. The Albanian terrorists boasted for a long time about their contacts at that consulate. Its staff structure has now been changed, and there is hope that that will no longer be the case.

For what purpose is the Swiss government keeping silent? The average Swiss travels along shut up inside his car just like a Swiss watch. The world of work makes a religion of work. At dawn, a programmed computer turns on the heat in his house, and does the same thing again at dusk when it expects him to come home from work. Another computer guides his daily movements, and he does not have time to think about the remaining coals from the fires in the Liman Platz park that are lit by those who still have some strength of will.

A Swiss shows the strength of his patriotism by the amount of taxes that he pays, and he is terribly sensitive about how his main "emotion" is handled.

Drug addicts receive free needles, and that is a rational decision, because even more widespread infection of those young people who are already infected with AIDS would wreck the national health budget. America has already tried that. The doses of methadone that are distributed every morning by the Salvation Army will not cure the wretches in Liman Platz by replacing heroin with "lighter" drugs, but it will stop them from moving in their delirium from the sacrificed Liman Platz to Parade Platz, where they would spoil the general impression and a great deal of business.

Why doesn't Switzerland take legal steps to shut off the drug traffic? The organized state does not know the names of the terrorists, which can be learned with a little luck by a journalist on assignment. It will be interesting to get an answer as to whether the Swiss courts will be willing and interested in hearing testimony about those discoveries.

So far, the attempts by investigative authorities have ended up with unproven suspicions. Individuals have stayed briefly in Swiss jails, and that is all. It was proven that a certain Kolja Erenik from Gnjiljane was involved in the drug traffic. He served his sentence: he was expelled from one canton to another. Swiss wives are the best guarantee that Switzerland cannot expel the main Albanian terrorists from its territory.

Individual actions by the police have not been able to cope with them. The solidarity of the clans has been carried over to this country as well, as it is impossible to break it.

Interpol is also helpless. Many of them simply have passports issued in Kosovo under completely different names. Thus, Salim Hasandjekaj became Latif Ljatifi, Salih Krasnici became Elbasan Barjaktari, Sertokaj Hisen has a passport in the name of Kroni Sefket...

Was our consulate in Switzerland really unable to point out such situations in previous years? Why is the Yugoslav government ignoring all of this?

Switzerland is involved in a long network. The number of people given asylum before the end of last year grew by 46 percent. Most of them are from Kosovo. The bosses come to one reception center at a fortress in the middle of Arau and lead their recruits away from the camp. Rabita, an organization with the ambition of uniting world Islam, keeps millions of dollars in Zurich vaults, and it is very sensitive to the fate of Albanians from Yugoslavia.

Before and after Ramazan, the Kuwaiti Embassy organizes free vacations in Kuwait and other Eastern countries for Albanians from Kosovo-Metohija. Kuwait is offering a public guarantee that if there is a general strike by Albanians in Kosovo, it will support all their families, together with other Arab brothers, in the name of Islam.

And almost overnight, the Albanian emigres in Switzerland, organized as "Marxist-Leninists," became fighters for the unification of Moslem Albania, a monarchy modeled after Balli Kombetar. Their previous organization by cells and circles has been replaced by the clans, something which is considered absolutely essential in the preparations for a general war.

The Albanian terrorists provide employment for workers from Kosovo on Swiss estates, and have a monopoly there. Each one employed "for the general cause" pays 200 Swiss francs a month.

There is exceptional cooperation with Moslem fundamentalists in Paris. At one public discussion which was held in Geneva, the Albanian terrorists openly emphasized that "their struggle was inseparable from the struggle of Croats and Slovenes against the Greater Serbian nationalists." In the event that things in Albania itself do not go as desired, it was emphasized then that Albanian Kosovo would want a federation with Croatia and Slovenia, and the only thing that remained unexplained was how they would jump across the territory of that little Serbia proper. Is this a question of breaking it up and destroying it again?

Switzerland is deaf to all of this, or helpless. Historians have now revealed to the scholarly public that the Swiss Red Cross organized Pavelic's escape at the end of the war. Now it is also organizing sterile needles for the "golden hit" that is sending its entire younger generation to death.

People are dying, but the secrets are still not being kept.

## GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

### Collective Agriculture Blamed for Increased Ecological Damage

90GE0035A East Berlin

WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFT in German Mar 90  
pp 342-359

[Article by author collective including Prof. Dr. Klaus Ahrends, economist; Prof. em. Dr. Richard Heinrich, WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFT editorial board; and Margrit Rack, research assistant: "The Interrelationship Between Large-Scale Intensification and the Reproduction of Natural Resources in Agriculture"]

[Text] The establishment of a rational interrelationship between a modern society and nature is a complicated, contradictory, long-term process. It touches upon a multiplicity of social developmental problems. The fact that the pace and stability of economic growth are ever more dependent upon the quality of the environment and the degree to which it is reestablished is a fact which has been stated many times. At the same time, it must be assumed today that the maintenance and protection of the natural environment takes on the rank of a fundamental social need, comparable with full employment, education, alimentation, dwelling, etc. Thus, the maintenance of the functioning ability of the ecological system or improving its condition is an essential moment of every modern social concept.

The utilitarian relationship with nature, which is frequently imputed to socialism is, at least theoretically, unjustified. Engels saw the reconciliation of mankind with nature and with itself<sup>1</sup> to be the great turnabout in the history of civilization. The intensive use of nature and the reproduction of the natural fundamentals of life for man need not be any kind of antagonism. Unfortunately, the relationship is also not free of contradictions. It is, for example, influenced by the diverse economic conditions and possibilities of the present and future satisfaction of requirements. The relationship between current and future natural reproduction conditions must be shaped in such a manner as to impart durability and stability to social progress.

We believe that intensively expanded reproduction is a type of reproduction which tends to dismantle the contradiction between the economy and the ecology. This is also applicable, as a matter of principle, to agrarian production. It is also significant that this process—as is true in every area of the national economy—proceed in agriculture on the basis of specific conditions for reproduction. For agricultural production, natural resources, and natural conditions—given the current extent of knowledge and status of development of science and technology—are an elemental and irreplaceable condition for production and reproduction. In no other

national economic sector are the economic and ecological processes so closely linked as they are in agriculture. This is primarily the result of the character of agrarian production as the creation and transformation of biological substances and is based on the fact that the principal means of production at the disposal of the LPG's [Agricultural Producer Cooperative] and VEG's [State farm] are biological systems. Land is the principal element among the natural resources and occupies a central position in the relationship between agriculture and nature. More than 57 percent of the total area of the GDR is utilized for agricultural purposes. Thus, agricultural production exerts a considerable influence upon the environment.

All useful agricultural areas, the entire agricultural economy, has other tasks to fulfill in addition to the production of foodstuffs and fodders. Land which is used agriculturally contributes toward the regeneration of seepage water as an activated filter. The growth of biological plants is an important source for the enrichment of the atmosphere with oxygen and for the reduction of the share of harmful agents in the air, such as sulfur dioxide and hydrocarbons. Agricultural land areas offer the required living space to many wild plants and animals. Not a few agricultural areas make it possible to fulfill the cultural/esthetic needs of mankind and to facilitate free time and recreational activities.

For purposes of the intensification process, this means the opening up and expansion of the natural potential of the biological means of production into the center point of intensification strategy and the making of ecological interrelationships into a foundation of the agrarian reproduction process. What is involved is the need to bring the type and method of agrarian production into better agreement with the ecological laws, to orient it toward the utilization as well as reproduction of natural resources. Comprehensive intensification of agriculture and reproduction of the performance capability of agricultural economic systems are no alternatives, but rather are closely connected and represent practically solvable tasks. It is only in the unity of the economy and the ecology that the intensification process within the LPG's and VEG's can render a growing and lasting contribution toward social progress in the GDR. Every alternative thought along the lines that a more environmentally oriented performance must necessarily result in lower yields and performances, or vice versa, that production growth and efficiency growth must, at least temporarily, be accomplished at the expense of the functional capability of the ecological system, does not promote the development of a modern agriculture which meets the social requirements of the present and the future. On the basis of the dynamics and the contradictory nature of many factors which influence the relationship between the economy and the ecology, this process cannot be understood to be a one-time action, but only as a permanent task and challenge for cooperative farmers and employees in agriculture. The level which must be attained in this regard by a certain time is dependent



upon existing basic social conditions. The essential prerequisites for the creation of an optimal relationship between the economy and the ecology in agriculture are the following:

- A scientific-technical empirical headstart which exposes the ongoing biological processes in the soil, in plants, and in animals and, thus, creates the possibilities for their direct control.
- Material-technical and personnel conditions in the form of performance-capable and environment-protecting means of production and qualified manpower.
- The existence of action-capable ecological systems, whose elements include the soil, plants, animals, substance-breakdown and humus-forming organisms in which the elements react directly and indirectly to any disruption of these systems.
- Economic conditions which bring into agreement the promotion of the creation of unity between the intensive utilization and reproduction of the natural potential and operational, sectoral, and social interests.
- Social stability and development of the village as a dwelling place and a place to work for a large portion of the population. In those villages in which the population has drastically declined, in which the social relationships and social contacts have been impoverished, elemental objective and subjective conditions for the application of environment-protecting technologies in agricultural production are frequently absent, as are the conditions for the development of an environment-producing life-style. Stable villages are a contribution with respect to the maintenance of our cultural landscape which was created in the long-term historical process.

In order to avoid making subjective mistakes in handling natural resources and the beauty of nature, the following is required:

- producers must be universally informed about ecological facts and the required knowledge regarding the various interrelationships in nature must be comprehensively disseminated and imparted.
- Knowledge of the standards and limitations, as well as the legal bases of environmental and nature protection must be strengthened and intensified.
- An appropriate environmental consciousness, based on ecological knowledge, particularly among the management levels of the LPG's and VEG's and other enterprises and installations, must be developed.
- Interest in, motivation, attitudes, and ways of conduct with respect to appropriate environmental behavior must be developed in all workers in agriculture.

#### New Reproduction Conditions for the Establishment of Unity Between the Economy and the Ecology

In the 1960's and 1970's, fundamentally new conditions pertaining to the reproduction of natural resources arose

in the agricultural industry of the GDR. The following were the characteristics of these conditions:

- first, the establishment and strengthening of modern large-scale production. Development of the enterprise structure makes it clear that, during this time frame, the concentration and centralization level of agricultural production was significantly increased (see Table 1). By intensifying specialization, combination, and cooperation, new production and efficiency potentials were uncovered.

**Table 1. Development of the Enterprise Structure in GDR Agriculture in the Time Frame of 1960 Through 1980**

Year	Number of Socialist Agricultural Enterprises	Average Agricultural Land Per Enterprise (Hectares)
1960	20,800	About 290
1970	9,866	About 600
1980*	1,413	Over 4,000

\* Plant production only

Source: Computations on the basis of "Statistischen Jahrbuchs der DDR 1988" [Statistical Yearbook for the GDR 1988], State Publishing House of the GDR, Berlin, 1989.

The organization of animal and plant production in the form of independent economic units based on the division of labor proved to be the turning point in the development of agriculture in the GDR. It brought about the development of completely new forms of cooperative joint action. This was also true with respect to the reproduction of the agroecological system, which it was not possible to organize without problems among economically independent economic units.

- Second, significant progress was made in shifting agriculture to industrial-type production methods in the 1960's and 1970's. Essential elements of a material-technical basis were created at a hitherto unprecedented pace which were commensurate with the conditions of large-scale production. These include primarily highly productive machine systems and facilities which facilitated the first-type mechanization of many work processes in agriculture or significantly increased the degree of mechanization of these work processes (see Table 2).

**Table 2. Development of the Degree of Mechanization in Plant Production (in Percent of Arable Land)**

Work Process	1960	1970	1980
Grain harvest using combines	38	99	100
Potato harvest using full harvest machines	25	77	96
Sugar beet harvest with full harvest machines	46	100	100

Source: Data for 1960: DEUTSCHE AGRARTECHNIK, Berlin, No. 10, 1969, p 458; data for 1970 and 1980: INTERNATIONALE ZEITSCHRIFT FUER DIE LANDWIRTSCHAFT, Moscow/Berlin, No. 2, 1982, p 183.



As a result of the radical change in many production processes, labor productivity in agriculture rose more rapidly than the average for the rest of the national economy and around 220,000 agricultural workers were made available to other national economic sectors.

- Third, the fact that fund-intensive processes dominated the intensification process of the 1960's and 1970's is closely connected with the spread of industrial-type production methods. Consumption of embodied labor rose more rapidly than the cost of embodied labor per production unit, which caused a tendency for agricultural production to decline in efficiency. Consumption of materials and services, which did not directly contribute to increasing agricultural production, increased and made the reproduction of natural resources at the disposal of the LPG's and VEG's more difficult. In terms of value, this development is seen in a more rapid growth of production consumption, as compared to the development of the gross as well as the net product (see Table 3).

**Table 3. Development of Selected Indicators for the Agricultural Reproduction Process in the GDR (Comparable Prices 1980; 1961 Through 1965 = 100)**

Item	1966-70	1971-75	1976-80
Gross product	125	151	171
Production consumption	129	173	208
Net product	120	125	126

Source: Collective of authors, "Intensivierung der Landwirtschaft" [Intensification in Agriculture], Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1984, p 23.

If one evaluates the intensification of agriculture in the time frame of 1960-80 from the standpoint of its contribution to social progress, the following significant economic and social changes must first be mentioned: In 1961/1965 through 1976/1980, the average annual yield with respect to plant production, measured in units of 100 kg/hectare, rose as follows: grain, from 26 to 36; potatoes, from 166 to 176; sugar beets, from 244 to 269; field fodder (excluding corn), from 175 to 352. Within the same time frame, livestock production increased even faster than plant production; in terms of slaughter cattle, it rose from 1.4 to 2.4 million tons, in terms of milk, from 4.6 to 7.1 million tons, in the case of eggs, from 2.5 to 5.3 billion eggs. This development in agricultural production contributed significantly toward satisfying the alimentary requirements of the populace in growing quantities.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, these changes provided the foundation for social progress in the villages, which found expression in improved working and living conditions for cooperative farmers and workers. Primarily as a result of the growing degree of mechanization pertaining to the principal work processes in plant and animal production, it was possible to reduce the number of labor-intensive operations. Increased income,

the availability of annual vacations, improved infrastructure services, development of capacities to provide child care and medical services were measures taken to reduce the social differences between town and country.

At the same time—and this, too, is a yardstick for evaluating social progress in rural areas—the results of the changes in agricultural production in the 1960's and 1970's did not assure the regeneration of the economic potential of many natural resources nor did the industrial type of agricultural production always consider the reciprocal nature of the economic and ecological conditions which existed. The adaptation of the agricultural ecosystem to the new technological and organizational conditions governing agrarian production serves primarily to increase yields and labor productivity. Economy dominated over ecology.

The intensification of material-economic relationships was not always at the center of the intensification strategies of the time. This fact resulted, primarily, in the fact that changes in the type and manner of agricultural production were predominantly extensive in character. The growing commitment of modern production means obviously caused not only a substitution of embodied labor, but also, in part, resulted in the substitution of natural forces which always played an active role in the agricultural reproduction process and helped to determine the cost of labor per unit of production. Characteristic of the predominantly extensive development of the relationship between agricultural production and natural environment, for example, was the consolidation of agricultural land in order to increase crop sizes. With this goal in mind, natural "obstacles" such as groups of trees, hedges, water holes, ditches were removed as being "disruptive" of consolidation, rivers and streams were regulated, and waterways which were bordered by timber had to, in part, give way to waterways which could be cleared with machinery. In individual cases, the contour of the land was adapted to technological conditions governing large-scale production. For example, the assumption that the technological quality and efficiency of a work process would increase in linear dependence upon the size of the land parcel involved as the smallest unit of cultivation had an extremely detrimental effect. Individual land parcels of up to 300 hectares in size were created and their long side dimensions measured more than 2,000 meters.<sup>3</sup>

The increased use of heavy equipment, a growing number of passes, the frequently inadequate supply of organic substance, and a high degree of crop concentration resulted in disrupting the reproduction of soil fertility, led to soil compaction, and erosion of the top soil. The establishment of large stands, the elimination of landscape elements, and the neglecting of extensive forms of utilization had an effect upon the living space and living conditions of many plants and animals which are tied to the agricultural area. For example:

- The changed technology and the new technological processes in conjunction with the loss of cover possibilities, which led to the decline in the rabbit population.

- The decline in insect populations as a result of the lack of suitable living space, loss of host plants, loss of blossom offerings as a result of the effects of herbicide use, resulting in lowering of the food supply for the giant bustard, for pheasants, partridges, and quail.
- The decline in nutrient-poor areas as conditions for the existence of meadows, marginal growths, wet meadows, and other plant populations.

The increased and partially undifferentiated use of low-quality mineral fertilizers and chemical plant protection agents also rendered the lasting reproduction of natural resources more difficult. In conjunction with other factors, this causes:

- The penetration of an increasing quantity of mineral fertilizers (primarily nitrates) into groundwater and surface water and contaminates these sources.
- The penetration of difficult-to-eliminate chemical substances in the soil, in plants, and in waterways to increase.
- A decline in the natural inventory of plants and animals.

Part of the intensification strategy in the developmental sector of agriculture in the GDR included attempts to compensate for several negative effects in the agricultural ecosystem, which had already been recognized at the time, through priority assistance rendered to nature protection. Based on the nature protection law of 1954 and the appropriate continuation of these provisions in the land culture law of 1970, special protection was planned, among other things, for selected wild plants and animal species, for nature and landscape protection areas, as well as for natural monuments and directives for their utilization and care were worked out. The domestic flora and fauna was widely charted, beavers were resettled, giant bustards, pheasants, and partridges were artificially raised and endangered lower wildlife stocks were no longer hunted. Despite the partially considerable results achieved as a result of these nature-protecting measures, their economic and ecological effect remains limited to exceptional areas, exceptional plants, animals, and situations.

In agricultural economic units, economic growth and maintenance of performance levels in the agro-economic system as target magnitudes for intensification of production did not enjoy equality in valuation. Establishment of unity between intensive utilization and reproduction of natural resources was, as a rule, not the object of their activities. This did not change until the necessity arose to intensify resource conservation, that is to say, until the increase in production in agriculture was inseparably linked to the decline in the cost of living and embodied labor per unit of production. With the beginning transition toward resource-conserving reproduction, the expansion and opening up of the economic potential of the soil, of crop plants, and utility animals came increasingly into the center point of agricultural production intensification.<sup>4</sup> This also changed the position of the natural environment in intensification

strategy. Reproduction of natural resources in agriculture became a source of growth for production and efficiency.

#### **Improvement of the Relationship Between the Economy and the Ecology in the Agricultural Reproduction Process During the 1980's**

Intensive expansion of reproduction includes a rationally structured ecological substance-exchange process between nature and society. Experiences which were gathered during the comprehensive intensification of agricultural production in the 1980's in the GDR confirm that this type of reproduction requires the overcoming of existing contradictions in the relationship between the economy and the ecology. The basis for this is the need to perfect the technologies involved in plant and animal production in such a way that the economic potentials are used to produce economic performance increases and, thus, their reproduction is permanently facilitated.

The balance of the 1980's shows improvements in the condition of several agricultural ecosystems in comparison with their condition at the end of the 1970's. It contravenes the occasional view heard in international discussions that large specialized agricultural enterprises in central Europe are not in a position of mastering environmental problems. The creation of an environment-oriented agriculture is not primarily a question of the existence of agricultural large-scale enterprises or peasant family farms, but rather a problem of the social conditions and relationships under which production is accomplished and a problem of the developmental level of the productive forces involved. For example, the lack of the profit motive and of economic pressure which influences the type and manner of agricultural production from the standpoint of securing the operator's existence presents basically better social prerequisites for the LPG's and the VEG's to be able to produce in harmony with environmental requirements than these factors do for most individually operated agrarian territories of Western Europe. Moreover, the work of the around 5,000 cooperatives and state-owned agricultural enterprises is subject to a relatively strict system of social control. The reproduction process in the LPG's and VEG's is the subject of a broad public discussion in the collectives. This publicity must be more strongly utilized as an important social motivating force to accomplish an environment-oriented agricultural type of production.

An effective system of foodstuffs and veterinary hygiene control contributes to the protection of man against health-endangering materials in the food chain. In the GDR, this system corresponds to international standards. Thus, for example, in each Bezirk, there is an Institute for Veterinary Medicine which undertakes voluminous investigations involving the problem of medication residues in meat. At the end of 1986, veterinary medicine centers for foodstuffs hygiene residual toxicology were established in five Bezirke on a preliminary basis (Schwerin, Berlin, Potsdam, Frankfurt/Oder,

Erfurt, and Karl-Marx-Stadt). In order to improve the direction of these centers, among others, 1989 saw the establishment of the Institute for Veterinary Foodstuffs Hygiene with its headquarters at Dahleitz-Hoppegarten. The focal point of the work to improve the hygienic status of foodstuffs over the next few years is to bridge still existing gaps between valid legal standards and material-technical conditions in the processing industry and in agriculture.

In the 1980's, progress in improving the relationship between the economy and the ecology in the agricultural reproduction process was achieved primarily in the following directions:

First, it was possible to reduce soil losses as a result of water and wind erosion somewhat. The soil is the most valuable natural resource which society has and is, therefore, also the focal point of all efforts in agriculture aimed at reproducing the environment. It is a fact that approximately one-half of the agricultural land in the GDR is threatened by water and wind erosion. In some territories, these types of soil losses have or are achieving magnitudes which prevent the increases of yields in certain crops. Reducing soil losses due to erosion became a fundamental requirement during intensification of plant production. At the center point of this effort stood measures involving production-integrated erosion protection, that is to say, the reduction of the erosion danger by cultivation methods, such as reduction in the size of crop stands,<sup>5</sup> reduction of the technologically dependent time span during which the soil is left without cover, and a reduction in the number of vehicle tracks left on arable land. Also, open-field timber cultivation was expanded,<sup>6</sup> which, apart from preventing wind and water erosion, also contributes to the mitigation of the climate and temperature extremes, to increasing the biological multiplicity of animal and plant life, as well as of the territories—primarily by contributing to the creation of a diversified cultural landscape and, last but not least, to increasing the production of utility lumber<sup>7</sup> and toward reducing dust stress.

Second, progress was achieved in the reproduction of soil fertility. Even this is a central task, both from the economic and also from the ecological standpoint. During the period under consideration, the priority problem was to cover the annual loss of organic substances by providing supplies of organic material. The increasing gap between the quantities of organic substances used and supplied to the soil in the 1970's was almost closed again on average across the GDR.<sup>8</sup> Toward this end, the LPG's, the VEG's, and their coproduction partners exerted significant efforts and expended significant funds. Thus, the quantity of organic fertilizer applied to arable land rose from 6.2 million tons in 1982—measured in terms of organic dehydrated stable manure—to 8.1 million tons in 1988. This is an increase of approximately one-third. The coverage of soil requirements for organic substance rose from 74 to 93 percent. Annually, around 1.4 to 1.5 million hectares of agricultural land are provided solid organic fertilizer; some 750,000 hectares are treated with liquid fertilizer. Storage

capacities for barnyard fertilizer, liquid fertilizer, and liquid manure were substantially expanded. Where, at the end of the 1970's, storage capacities for the intermediate storage of liquid fertilizer were sufficient only for 30 days, in 1988 they were adequate for 60 days. The positive effects of the better supply to the soil of organic substances upon the stability and performance capability of the agricultural ecosystem and on the natural functioning of the territories can also be proved empirically in the final analysis by more stable and rising yields.<sup>9</sup>

Third, visible progress was achieved in reducing the specific consumption of mineral fertilizer. Whereas on the average in the years 1978/1982 some 2.77 kg of nitrogen were required to produce 100 kg of grain, this figure declined to 2.43 kg by 1988. The specific consumption of phosphate and potash fertilizer declined during this period (phosphate: 1.45 kg in 1978/1982, 1.01 kg in 1988; potash: 1.97 kg in 1978/1982, 1.73 kg in 1988). This development indicates that a growing share of mineral fertilizers was taken up by plants—in other words, was transformed into yields—and that fertilizer losses declined. Nitrogen losses as a result of leaching declined from 40 kg/hectare (1978/1982) to 28 kg/hectare (1987). Thus, in 1987, 12 kg/hectare of nitrogen were used more productively than was the case on the average for the years 1978/1982.<sup>10</sup> Unfortunately, this development did not continue for the period 1988/1989.

This progress in the relationship between the economy and the ecology in the agricultural reproduction process in the 1980's should not be misleading with respect to the contradictions which exist between the requirements of reproduction as they pertain to the environment and the type and manner of agricultural production in the GDR. The only thing that is pointed out is that the resource-saving intensification in agriculture promoted unity between the economy and the ecology.

#### **The Relationship Between the Economy and the Ecology at a Qualitatively New Level**

The necessary stability in the growth of production and efficiency in agriculture requires that economic and ecological requirements of intensification be united still further over the next years. In this respect, the point of departure must be the achieved level of utility intensity in natural resources involved in agricultural production, which must be raised or lowered in a differentiated manner. A general renunciation of the productive use of biological potentials, on which the concept of an "alternative" agriculture is based, or the transition to extensive utility forms are not in the interest of society nor of the majority of its members because of the limited nature of the national resource potential. A reduction of the production level would be connected with this move. The pace of social progress in the villages would be unavoidably slowed. For these reasons, there are virtually no alternatives in the agricultural intensification process to paying greater attention to ecological legalities.

The first fundamental direction toward a balanced relationship between the economy and the ecology at a qualitatively new level is the strengthening of cooperation between national economic sectors and branches which must result in the working out and systematic realization of national economic strategies to maintain and reproduce the economic potential of biological resources in agricultural production. Although agriculture is the direct user of soil, plants, and animals, it is not solely responsible for the reproduction of the economic potential and the reestablishment of the ecological function capability of these resources. The substantive intertwining of national economic sectors or branches and production as well as consumption is growing ever closer so that, objectively, more or less all national economic sectors participate in the reproduction of the agricultural ecosystem.

Scientific investigations and practical experiences document, for example, that emissions (sulfur dioxide, nitrous oxide, fluorine, heavy metals, dust, ashes, and other emissions) cause significant yield and efficiency losses in plant and livestock production. Moreover, emissions can enter the food chain through the air, water, soil, and plants, and thus have a detrimental effect upon the quality of agricultural products, as well as on the healthy alimentation of the populace.<sup>11</sup> For this reason, any reduction in the emission of harmful agents in other national economic sectors simultaneously contributes to intensifying agricultural production, to the maintenance of the performance capability of the agricultural ecosystem. Damage caused by emissions is limited through cultivation and other agricultural operations (working the soil, fertilizing, liming, crop rotation) or their effects on the soil, on plants, and on livestock are compensated for; however, this does not eliminate the causes of emissions.

As a result of the possible relocation of environment-producing investments or environmental effects, the question arises as to the branch in which the expenditures for the reproduction of the agricultural ecosystem would result in the greatest national economic utility—in agriculture or among the emitters? Although the answer will certainly not be alternative, such national economic calculations are desirable and purposeful because of the high degree of substantive intertwining between the branches, which is on the increase.

The necessity to achieve better coordination with respect to sector production systems in the future in order to restrict economically effective relocations of environmental effects between the branches and sectors of the economy also results from the fact that most material circulation problems can only be closed within the social framework—and that means based on a division of labor. This is illustrated by the example of the treatment of industrial and municipal wastewater. For agriculture, water is a strong yield-limiting factor. Wastewaters, because of the tight water balance, represent a great reserve with respect to expanding irrigation. Currently, there is a quantity of around 1.5 m<sup>3</sup> of municipal

wastewater. This could serve to provide supplemental irrigation for 30 percent of the agricultural utility land in the GDR. In actual fact, however, only one percent of the agricultural land has been opened up for use of municipal wastewater. In addition to other causes, the relatively large fluctuation of the materials contained in these waters has proven to be an obstacle to the expansion of municipal wastewater use in agriculture. The increased recovery of valuable raw materials and the decline in the quantity of harmful substances connected therewith, better possibilities for the more rapid determination of wastewater contents, as well as creation of additional storage capacities are fundamental prerequisites for expanding the use of wastewater in agriculture and for its planned introduction in soil and crop management as well as for the elimination of any harm done to man, animals, plants, and soil.

A particularly great influence upon the establishment of unity between the economy and the ecology in the agricultural reproduction process is exerted by the intertwining relationship between the capital goods industry and agriculture. Many of the environmental stresses which occur in the LPG's and VEG's are caused by the relatively low utility value of many industrial capital goods since "agriculture no longer naturally finds the conditions for its own production in itself, but that these conditions exist as an independent industry outside of agriculture."<sup>12</sup> Particularly great environmental stresses are those caused by the high weight of some agricultural machinery and by the relatively low quality and inappropriate structure of mineral fertilizers and plant protection agents and their application equipment. Every weight reduction of agricultural machinery is, thus, not only an advantage from the material-economic standpoint for the producer, but simultaneously improves the material-technical conditions for the reproduction of natural resources in the LPG's and VEG's. A similar relationship exists between the environmental stresses caused by the relatively low utility value of some agricultural chemicals in agriculture and the relatively high material costs in the appropriate industrial branch. The rapid beneficiation of raw materials and the renewal or expansion of the assortment of agricultural chemicals connected therewith are, thus, an important prerequisite for future and better consideration of ecological legalities in the agricultural intensification process. These interconnections make it clear that without qualitative changes in the relationships between the capital goods industry and agriculture function-capable agricultural ecosystems cannot be facilitated for the long run in the LPG's and VEG's.

The second fundamental direction toward a balanced relationship between the economy and the ecology at a qualitatively higher level pertains to changes in the type and manner of agricultural production itself. What is involved is the concept of intensification which connects the yield and efficiency growth idea inseparably from the reproduction of natural resources and is oriented at systematically overcoming contradictions which exist in

the relationship between man and nature. This concept is characterized by the fact that it is oriented at the acceleration of scientific-technical progress as the principal path toward achieving a new quality in the man-nature relationship in agriculture. It is based on the fact that, primarily by using modern technologies and by producing close ties between agricultural production and science, stable and reproducible intensification effects can be created on the basis of performance-capable ecological systems. Therefore, scientific-technical solutions for the reproduction of natural resources, the lowering of production consumption, and the environment-oriented reuse of wastewater and waste products should be more consistently oriented in this direction. The same direction involves the inclusion of ecological parameters in evaluating the social utility of scientific and technical solutions. As evaluation criteria, they should occupy the same rank with respect to research results and investments in agriculture as is assigned to yield, performance, and efficiency increases. Following are the main points involved in the realization of an ecology-oriented intensification process in agriculture through the year 2000:

1. Creation of a complex system for the reproduction of soil fertility. Despite considerable progress in this area in the 1980's, the maintenance and improvement of soil as a biological system continues to be the center point. The soil continues to be subjected to stresses which limit the reproduction of its fertility and, thus, render the assurance of the lasting nature and stability of intensification more difficult. These stresses include both growing compacting damage and structural changes,<sup>13</sup> partial wind and water erosion, as well as existing gaps between the demand and supply of organic substances in the soil in individual territories and agricultural enterprises. Another component of the system is soil protection against contamination by heavy metals. Since 1987, the heavy metal stressing of agricultural soils in the GDR has been systematically and comprehensively analyzed.

Valid limit values correspond to international figures; adhering to them protects plants, animals, and, in the final analysis, man himself against the high intake of harmful agents. The stressing of the soils which has been determined is an important foundation for the danger-free application of waste products containing heavy metal admixtures in plant production.

The current minimum stressing of most soils (see Table 5) [editor's note: there is no Table 4] must not lead to the careless handling of heavy metal waste products. In this regard, particular significance attaches to the use of sludge. For the GDR, 155,000 tons of dried sludge were found to exist in 1983—by 1990, this amount will increase to 400,000 to 500,000 tons.<sup>14</sup> The stressing of these quantities of sludge with heavy metals varies, depending on whether they originated as a result of treating municipal or industrial wastewaters. Any utilization of sludge—that is to say, the utilization of organic substances and plant nutrients it contains in the production of biomass, including the avoidance of environmental stresses can currently only occur in

agriculture with adherence to all application guidelines.<sup>15</sup> For this reason as well, it is urgently necessary that heavy metal emissions be systematically decreased, that existing possibilities (for example, ion separators) be better utilized or that measures for the reclamation of valuable raw materials be further expanded.

**Table 5. Values of Heavy Metal Stressing Pertaining to Agricultural Areas in the GDR (Milligrams per Kilogram of Soil)**

Item	Determined Limit Values	Determined Median Values in Examined Areas
Cadmium	1-3	0.21
Copper	100	12
Nickel	50	14
Lead	100	28
Zinc	300	50

*Source: Compiled on the basis of data provided by the Institute for Plant Nutrition of the GDR Academy of Agricultural Sciences.*

Increased weight with respect to the reproduction of soil fertility is ascribed to the reclamation and recultivation of devastated areas. Strip mines which are scheduled for opening through the year 2030 impact on some 180,000 hectares of agricultural land, including 52 percent of agricultural utility land and 39 percent of forestland. About one-third of the agricultural areas to be devastated are among the most productive loessial soil, chernozem, and deep loam locations.<sup>16</sup>

In the GDR, great experiences have thus far been gathered with respect to the reclamation of former strip mines. Nevertheless, the loss of land to mining can currently not be equalized either quantitatively<sup>17</sup> or qualitatively through recultivation measures. In recent years, problems have arisen primarily as a result of the inadequate quality of a majority of the returned land areas. Increased performance requirements levied upon mining, accompanied by deteriorating geological conditions which compel the comprehensive use of highly productive extraction machinery and technologies, lead ever more frequently to a reduction of the possibilities for the selective acquisition, transport, and dumping of top soil which is particularly well-suited for subsequent use in agriculture and forestry. In this manner, for example, natural potentials are lost and long-range small yields and higher production costs in agricultural production in these recultivated areas must be taken into account (the recultivation time frame for agriculturally useful land is 12 to 20 years).

Desirable technological changes in overburden removal or in land reclamation are proving to be economically and ecologically effective measures, when subsequent costs are taken into account. The long-term economic effects of a selective dumping of the overburden in agriculture and forestry areas are, for example, substantially higher than the cost savings achieved in mining as

a result of the transition to "more productive" processes involved in overburden extraction.<sup>18</sup>

2. Increases in the degree of utilization pertaining to mineral fertilizers and plant protection agents. The increases in the degree of utilization pertaining to fertilizers, which were achieved in the 1980's, must be followed up by new steps aimed at continuously reducing the stressing of the atmosphere, of the soil, and of groundwater resources by agricultural chemicals. In addition to further decreases in specific fertilizer use through product as well as technical and technological innovations, this also involves a clear increase in the degree of effectiveness of plant protection agents. With this goal in mind, first the product assortment must be systematically renewed and expanded. This is necessary in order to improve the selective effect of plant protection agents, in order to facilitate their complete decomposition which would be harmless to the agricultural ecosystem, as well as to extensively eliminate undesirable side effects. Second, the provision of a new generation of application equipment must create prerequisites for the chemicals to be more precisely dispensed and be applied in the immediate vicinity of plants. Third, the application of plant protection agents must be qualified on the basis of damage agent and crop stand monitoring. Together with the broad utilization of biological pest control methods—as a component of integrated plant protection—this technological innovation contributes to minimizing the negative effect of plant protection measures upon the natural environment and helps reduce the specific consumption of plant protection agents.<sup>19</sup> Special challenges are posed by fertilization and the use of plant protection agents in drinking water protection areas. Currently, 80 percent of the potable water in the GDR is obtained from groundwater and 70 percent of the usable potable water lies beneath agricultural utility areas. Some 14 percent of the agricultural utility area of the GDR—more than 800,000 hectares—is designated as drinking water protection area.<sup>20</sup> The regulations and directives for the use of agricultural land in drinking water protection areas, which were agreed upon in 1987, represent management difficulties for the impacted plant production enterprises in comparison with other enterprises—difficulties which are generally connected with operational disadvantages. In order to mitigate the effects upon crop yields and the concomitant economic results of these enterprises and to increase their interest in adhering to the technological restrictions, the production structures intensification strategies must be more rapidly adapted to the special conditions which govern agricultural production in drinking water protection zones and resulting yield reductions must be compensated for with budgetary funds.

3. Greater consideration of ecological requirements in intensified livestock production. In livestock production enterprises, intensified production results in an increase of the interrelationships between the economy and the ecology. In the next few years, what is involved here is the need to supplement existing technologies with such

elements which will assure an environmentally protective and soil fertility-promoting utilization of organic fertilizers.<sup>21</sup> In this regard, further reductions of losses by the orderly storing of stable manure, the expansion of liquid fertilizer capacities—depending on local conditions, storage capacities of from 50 to 120 days are desirable—and the modernization of application equipment are important target magnitudes. Environmental stresses caused by livestock production include ammonia, dust, and odor emissions. The main direction for the systematic reduction of the resulting stresses to man and the environment include technical-technological innovations which treat the waste air in stable facilities in conjunction with reclaiming heat and which restrict the formation of ammonia. In addition to improving the working environment, they simultaneously contribute to improving livestock health, increasing the performance of livestock herds, and reducing the loss of nutrients within the soil—plant—animal—soil cycle.

4. Assurance of the ecological stability and variety of agricultural areas. Intensive use of natural resources reaches deeply and universally into the nature budget, into natural systems, and into the living space and living conditions of wild plants and animals.<sup>22</sup> This requires that the resulting consequences and secondary effects be evaluated in a forward-looking manner and taken into account appropriately, as well as requiring the correction of land culture error developments which occurred in previous times. An important prerequisite for this is the understanding and acceptance of agriculture, in which the use of all its elements such as the soil substrate, the relief, the microclimate, flowing and still waters, vegetation, and animal world and agrarian production occur as an ecological system.<sup>23</sup> With such an approach, the maintenance of stability in the agricultural ecosystem, which is extensively influenced by the types and form of varieties of the landscape, becomes an essential component of intensification measures. Variety in landscape creation does not require compulsive farm production structures, but rather conscious and planned creation of agricultural ecosystems based on the conditions of land use today and in the future.

This goal is comprehensively taken into account by the working out of field-size creation concepts and plans for the care of the landscape. It is these instruments which can act to secure the multiple uses of agriculture. Apart from economic targets, these concepts contain those measures which also satisfy other use requirements—protection of nature, nearby recreation, fishing, boating, water treatment, and others—in a given territory. Thus, the field-size creation concepts will see to it that:

- The productivity and yield capability of land areas, their intensive utilization in the long run, is facilitated.
- Crop location conditions are better utilized for a differentiated intensive type of agricultural production.
- Erosion threats to the soil are kept to a minimum.

- Intensively utilized agricultural landscape is created in accordance with esthetic viewpoints.
- Living conditions which favor a rich flora and fauna are established.
- An adequate multiplicity of landscape elements is used to increase the resistance of the arable land against disruptive influences—to increase its stability.
- Not only employees in the agricultural area, but all workers who are connected with agriculture experience a feeling of well-being in agriculture.<sup>24</sup>

Field-size conceptions which wish to meet these requirements are based on a precise analysis of all available landscape elements.<sup>25</sup> Including all interested forces and scientific installations, these concepts require one to one and one-half years to work out. It is the essential mission of these concepts to reintroduce various types of timber in the large-scale agricultural areas, to subdivide the landscape more, to create new biotope areas or reestablish biotope areas in order to, thus, enrich the variety of the landscape through a multiplicity of landscape elements.

In Bezirk Erfurt, which occupies a leading position in this area, a resolution of the Bezirk Council, dated August 1986, led to a beginning regarding the working out of a field-size creation concept. In 1988, 12 percent of the area of the bezirk had such conceptions, in 1989, the plan calls for 30 to 34 percent to be covered by such plans, and in 1992, the work is scheduled to be concluded. In Bezirk Magdeburg, there are also good experiences in this regard; other bezirks are yet to work on this project.

The ecology-integrated intensification of plant and livestock production is a long-term concept. Its realization depends, apart from the creation of the necessary research headstart, the appropriate material-technical means, and the manpower prerequisites, also upon the development of the performance capability of the LPG's and the VEG's which must earn the major portion of the financial means required for technical and technological innovation themselves as juridically independent economic units. To this extent, the economic and social support for economic units is a firm component of this developmental concept within GDR agriculture.

In this connection, it falls to the state to promote tendential agreement between long- and short-term economic interests of society as well as between national economic, territorial, enterprise, and personal interests. An analysis of the effectiveness of the existing economic mechanism with regard to the establishment of unity between the economy and the ecology in the agricultural reproduction process results in the following focal points with respect to reform:

1. Transition toward ecology-integrated state control of agricultural production. The extensively practiced exclusion of ecological aspects from state guidance to agriculture has led, among others, to contradictions between the

production task and the reproduction of territorial ecosystems—contradictions which are not solvable within the framework of many LPG and VEG cooperation projects. For purposes of systematically overcoming these contradictions, fundamental decisions in the various territories are desirable during the 1990's—decisions which will alter the current location distribution of agricultural productive forces and, thus, the volume and structure of production. Among others, they should be aimed at a closer coupling between territorial production conditions governing livestock and plant production, at a reduction of the intensification level, for example, in drinking water protection areas, at a differentiated increase in the intensification level, and at closing down areas of low fertility (soil value numbers below 18). Also, the extension of the planning horizon in economic units could promote stronger consideration for ecological requirements in the LPG's and VEG's. With the assistance of the annual plan, it is hardly possible to plan for the reproduction of the economic potentials of the natural resources functioning within the agricultural reproduction process. The reproduction time frame for many natural resources, which generally exceeds the period of one year, requires multiyear and extensively stable plan targets for agricultural economic units and districts. The solution of this task will be supported by long-range programs which are orientational in character. They must be supplemented with appropriate organizational-political and economic outline conditions.

2. Assuring the comprehensive nature and internal balance of enterprise planning. The current parallel nature and relative isolation of operational planning in agricultural production and environmental protection contradict the double character of many work processes in plant and livestock production and form an obstacle to the balanced development of the economy and the ecology at the LPG and VEG level or at the level of economic units. To raise the complexity of operational planning, for example, the inclusion of environment-creating measures in maximum yield concepts for field crops and maximum performance concepts for livestock would be a contribution. But even the working out and inclusion of tasks from field-size creation concepts and landscape care plans can result in increasing the complexity of operational plans. All of these measures are aimed at making the frequently one-sided orientation of collectives toward maximum yields and maximum performances relative and at achieving better integration with respect to the reestablishment of the reproduction ability of the territorial ecosystems as limiting factors in the production or efficiency growth into management activities. In the final analysis, what is involved is to undertake the planning of operational reproduction processes in such a way that economic growth within agricultural enterprises is not accomplished at the expense of the future.

3. Inclusion of land culture performances by agriculture or by agricultural economic units in performance evaluation. Many agricultural performances which produce



environmental effects appear in the current system of economic accounting only as cost components. As result magnitudes, they are not reflected in economic forms. They have no direct and provable influence upon value results within the agricultural reproduction process. For this reason, the economic interests of the LPG's and VEG's in expanding land culture performances is relatively small. The major portion of the land culture performances of the LPG's and VEG's is initiated with the aid of administrative directives or as a result of the threat of economic sanctions or it is accomplished as a necessary component of the intensification process. The theoretical foundation for the inclusion of measures producing environmental effects in the LPG's and VEG's in the performance evaluation is the economic valuation of the natural resources functioning within the agricultural reproduction process, particularly the soil. As long as the soil and other natural resources function as quasi-free goods in the agricultural reproduction process, achieved or unachieved performances of the LPG's and VEG's in the area of resource production appear neither as value-assigned results nor result declines in intensification. On the other hand, if an economic value is assigned to the soil, the measures at improving the soil are indicated as productive accumulation, depending on their economic substance. But even the opposite process is reflected in economic form. Every reduction in use value of the soil or every instant of destruction of the soil appears as a reduction of the inventory of productive resources for the enterprise, the territory, and society.

#### Footnotes

1. K. Marx, F. Engels, "Kleine oekonomische Schriften. Ein Sammelband" [Small Economic Writings. A Compendium], Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1955, p 17.
2. Per capita consumption increased during the time period under consideration by more than 50 percent for meat, by around 20 percent for butter, by eight percent for milk, and by 42 percent for eggs.
3. H. Weinitschke, "Naturschutz und Landnutzung" [Nature Protection and Land Use], VEB Gustav Fischer Verlag, Jena, 1987, p 96.
4. K. Ahrends, U. Neubauer, "On the Effective Use of the Nature Factor—Particularly of Land—in Agriculture," WIRTSCHAFTSWISSENSCHAFT, No. 7, 1985, pp 979 ff.
5. Median field size declined from 53 hectares in 1977 to 38 hectares in 1987.
6. While at the beginning of the eighties, 200 to 300 km of farmland-bordering timber was newly planted each year, in 1985, this figure rose to 791 km and in 1988 to 893 km. For the first half of the 1990's, more than 1,000 km of protective plantings per year are anticipated.
7. For example, a one-kilometer-long 17-year-old protective timber strip in Kreis Oranienburg yielded 586 meters of utility lumber. The total value was about M 154,000, at a cost of about M 15,000.
8. While in 1982, the difference between the withdrawal and supply of organic substance was 420 kg per hectare of arable land, in 1988 this figure was only 70 kg.
9. W. Jahn, A. Vogel, "Indicators for Judging the Reproduction of Organic Soil Substance," KOOPERATION, No. 8, 1989, p 352.
10. D. Spaar, "The Fulfillment of Economic and Ecological Requirements in Agriculture Under Conditions of Comprehensive Intensification—The Priority Task for Agricultural Research," report given at the plenary session of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences of the GDR on 1-2 December 1988, brochure of proceedings, p 27.
11. R. Ruethnik, "Problems and Tasks of Environmental Protection in Agriculture and Forestry," in "Umweltschutz in der Land- und Forstwirtschaft" [Environmental Protection in Agriculture and Forestry], VEB Deutscher Verlag der Grundstoffindustrie, Leipzig, 1985, pp 19 f; H. Weschcke, R. Herfurth, "Experiences Regarding Soil and Crop Management in the Emissions Territory of the Agricultural Production Association for Plant Production at Albersroda," FELDWIRTSCHAFT, No. 8, 1989, pp 348 ff.
12. K. Marx, "Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Oekonomie" [Fundamental Outlines of Criticism of Political Economics], Dietz Verlag, Berlin, 1974, p 426.
13. Top soil compaction exists in approximately 50 percent of diluvial soils, in 20 percent of the alluvial and loessial soils, as well as in 10 percent of the weathered soils. The compactions are primarily the result of the application of ever more performance-capable tractors, equipment, harvesting machinery, and transport vehicles, which, however, are simultaneously also heavier. Thus, for example, the weight of a harvester-thresher has doubled from the first to the third generation. It increased from 5,300 kg (Model E 175) to 9,700 kg (Model E 516).
14. B. Machelett, W. Podelsak, "The Use of Sludge in Plant Production—Control of Heavy Metal Contents," SCHUTZ UND NUTZUNG DES BODENS, colloquium of the Institute for Plant Nutrition, Jena, No. 3, 1988, p 53.
15. Possibilities for removing sludge currently include deposits in landfills, dumping at sea, as well as incineration.
16. W. Einhorn, "On the Efficiency of Land Reclamation From the National Economic Viewpoint," SCHUTZ UND NUTZUNG DES BODENS, op. cit., p 134.
17. From 1966 through 1970, 56.1 percent of the land areas taken for other purposes were reclaimed; in the time period 1971 through 1975, the figure was 56.3 percent; in 1976 through 1980, 40.4 percent, and 1981 through 1985, 43.6 percent.



18. W. Einhorn, op. cit., p 140.

19. In pomological enterprises, for example, it was possible to reduce the number of insecticide treatments from 10 to three.

20. In the southernmost bezirks, this share is greater. In Bezirk Gera, protective areas account for 37 percent of the agricultural land.

21. On an annual basis, some 25 million tons of stable manure, 50 million tons of liquid manure, and 10 million m<sup>3</sup> of organic fertilizers are spread on fields.

22. The agricultural landscape is replete with many free-living plants and animals; only 30 percent of these are secured in nature protection areas.

23. D. Spaar, "The Fulfillment of Economic and Ecological Requirements in Agriculture Under Conditions of Comprehensive Intensification—The Priority Task for Agricultural Research," report given at the plenary session of the Academy of Agricultural Sciences of the GDR on 1-2 December 1988 in Eberswalde.

24. H. Weinitschke, "Care of the Landscape and Nature Protection in the Process of Comprehensive Intensification," KOOPERATION, No. 1, 1988, pp 18 f.

25. Included are, for example, arable land, meadows, pastures, protected pastures, field timber, hedges, rows of trees, flowing streams, lakes, ponds, reservoirs, wetland areas, poor and drought-beset grass areas, heaths, scrub areas, stands of reeds and peat bogs, stream valleys, riverside soil areas, and embankments.

#### Auto Industry Survival Plans Sketched

90GE0036C Munich SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG  
in German 20 Mar 90 p 30

[Article by Franz Thoma: "How the GDR's Auto Industry Intends To Survive"—first paragraph is SUEDEDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG introduction]

[Text] Karl-Marx-Stadt, Mid-March—What was once the heart of Auto-Union, when this city was called Chemnitz, is today the core of the VEB IFA [State enterprise] Passenger Car Combine in the GDR: the Barkas factory. For the moment. The combine cannot survive in its present form; it is being divided up, converted into a corporation. Instead of the present 29 plants, with 65,000 employees, as the IFA director-general, Dieter Voigt, explains to Lothar Spaeth, the visiting minister president of Baden-Wuerttemberg, there will be about eight grouped around these corporations.

The second largest automobile manufacturer in the GDR after the Trabant manufacturer in Karl-Marx-Stadt and Zwickau with 13,000 workers, the VEB Automobile Factory Eisenach, is following the lead of Adam Opel AG in Ruesselsheim. Eisenach is to all intents and purposes ready to leave the IFA group.

The former administration building at the factory entrance, where Carl Hahn, the father of the present chairman of VW's board of directors, began to put together Auto-Union after mid-1932, is now a hospital. In view of the partnership that is already starting with Volkswagenwerk AG, Wolfsburg, this is not necessarily a bad omen for the new company, even if automobile builders in the GDR are facing hard times initially. After the expected currency union in mid-1990, it will become apparent very quickly that the Trabant (and possibly also the Wartburg from Eisenach) will be impossible to sell on the domestic market.

It appears highly questionable whether the production goal for 1990 of 20,000 four-stroke and 13,000 two-stroke Trabants, which was announced during a visit to the Zwickau factory, can be attained under these circumstances. And it is equally questionable whether expectations for exports in the East will be met. The Trabant 1.1 has a new (VW) engine and a new platform, but it has the same old body. "We are building a genuine oldie here," one of the workers says sarcastically. For the transition, Voigt is counting on temporary protection from duty, at least for as long as the GDR still exists. Or on product-linked subsidies, which will soon encounter EEC objections in the event of German unification.

The real hope for the Zwickau factory is assembly of the VW Polo, particularly as a new shop in the somewhat more contemporary Mosel factory not far from Zwickau, which was initially intended for the four-stroke Trabant, can be rapidly converted for the Polo with Wolfsburg's assistance. The four-stroke Trabant, production of which is planned to start in May, will be transferred to the old factory in Zwickau, which from a technical standpoint is absolutely out of date and ready for demolition. Originally production of the environmentally polluting two-stroke was supposed to continue here—but it has no chance in the marketplace.

For the Barkas factory itself, where the IFA pickup truck is built, Voigt has made advance preparations with a license to construct the low-pollution level VW four-stroke engine (which will be installed in the Trabant and the Wartburg). Currently between 900 and 1,000 engines are assembled every day in a noisy shop. The shop started operation in 1988 after being dismantled by VW in Salzgitter and rebuilt in Zwickau; the factory is capable of building 1,800 engines. The Volkswagen factory will take 120,000 of these units annually. In order to bridge the employment gap, VW will probably take delivery of components from Zwickau and Karl-Marx-Stadt.

#### Strong Man Act by VW

VW will concentrate its investments on the not quite so outmoded Mosel factory near Zwickau. A new paint spraying line is already in place there, delivered by a company in Wuerttemberg. The Sachsenring drive shaft factory next to it still has full employment. A new assembly plant will be put up on open ground as an

adjunct to a hall that was also built quite recently for the four-stroke Trabant. Beginning in 1993-94, 1,000 Polos daily will be assembled there—and automobile construction in Saxony, which is facing extinction without a partnership of this kind, will be saved. But the employment gap will not be closed until then. The switch to a new model and manufacturing that is competitive on the international level will take years. In the interim, there will be a shortage of revenues, but wages costs will continue. Provisionally VW has set aside DM 350 million. The entire project will require about DM 5 billion until 1994.

By that time the IFA-VW joint venture, as Voigt openly concedes, could have become a subsidiary of Wolfsburg. That is the legacy of a past when there were ideas, but never any money for the development of new models and new manufacturing methods. Not even in 1973, when, as factory directors in Zwickau explain, a new factory for a VW Golf-style car with an annual production of 600,000 vehicles was supposed to be built in Zwickau-Mosel in conjunction with the Czechoslovakian Skoda works. In 1970 it was in the five-year plan. In November 1973 it was all forgotten.

Deputy plant manager Wolfgang Neef gives assurances that experience in building bodies still exists from the time of Horch. The question is: has it dried up? The IFA combine factories in Karl-Marx-Stadt, Zwickau and elsewhere are in a worse position, now at least, than the automobile industry in Saxony was at the end of the 1920's. It was able to offer marketable models, but its craftsman-based manufacturing methods could not keep pace with the Americans. August Horch (1868-1951) in particular, who had come from Carl Benz, had resolutely developed and built the most beautiful automobiles at

his A. Horch & Cie, Motor Vehicle Works AG, Zwickau, but he had never thought of finances.

He had to leave and founded the Audi Works AG, Zwickau. But that did not work out. The Dane Jorgen Skafte Rasmussen, whose primary occupation was building DKW motorcycles in Zschopau, took over the majority of shares from Audi. But the world economic crisis cast long shadows. The Horch Works AG, Zwickau, Audi Works AG, Zwickau, Zschopau Motor Cycle Works, J.S. Rasmussen AG (DKW) and the automobile division of the Wanderer Works AG, Siegmarschoenau united to form retroactively as of 31 November 1931, Auto-Union AG, Chemnitz.

The majority of shares was no longer held by private shareholders, but by the state of Saxony through the Saxon State Bank. If manufacture had previously followed the workshop principle, production was now divided up into work steps—a "production flow" that was still not the same as work on the line. At the time a full 25 percent of the German market went to Auto-Union.

#### From Saxony to Bavaria

After World War II Auto-Union was expropriated, the plants were dismantled, and on 17 August 1948 stricken from the Chemnitz Trade Register. Hahn and Bruhn went to Bavaria where the economics minister at the time, Hanns Seidel, would have liked to have found a place for them in the former BMW aero engine plant in Allach, but this plan came to nought because of resistance from BMW. Instead, both of them were able to start in Ingolstadt. Son Hahn, the current head of VW, is now beginning over again in Zwickau where his father had begun to put together the Auto-Union concern and where he stopped in Saxony following the collapse.

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